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 MAKING ROOM FOR COOPERATIVE INNOVATION 
LIZA S. VERTINSKY 
ABSTRACT 
 Patent law, created in response to a constitutional mandate to encourage innovation, 
may be discouraging important forms of cooperative innovation. Advances in technology 
have enabled new ways of pooling knowledge and computational capabilities, facilitating 
cooperation among many participants with complementary skills and motivations to collec-
tively solve complex problems. But emerging models of cooperative innovation increasingly 
run into patent roadblocks.  
 Why might patent law sometimes thwart instead of support socially beneficial coopera-
tive innovation? The problem lies in the tensions between the market-based incentives that 
patent law creates and the mechanisms that support emerging models of cooperative innova-
tion. The complexity and cost of solving contemporary public challenges are nudging diverse 
participants together to collectively build their knowledge, but patents often serve to keep 
them apart. While digital technologies enable new forms of massively distributed, open and 
collaborative intellectual production, patents threaten the vitality and even the viability of 
these promising types of innovation.  
 In this Article I use two examples—the risk of crowding out crowd science and the battle 
between proprietary software companies and free open source software platforms—to illus-
trate how patent law in its current form may sometimes impede beneficial cooperation in 
innovation. I then suggest how we might limit the negative effects of patents in contexts of 
cooperative innovation without undermining the patent system.  
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I.   INTRODUCTION 
“In the long history of humankind (and animal kind, too), those 
who learned to collaborate and improvise most effectively have pre-
vailed.”—Charles Darwin 
 Systems of decentralized, massively distributed open innovation 
are emerging with increasing frequency and with the ability to har-
ness new resources in powerful new ways.1 People with no prior in-
 
 1. See, e.g., Yochai Benkler, Law, Policy, and Cooperation, in GOVERNMENT AND 
MARKETS: TOWARD A NEW THEORY OF REGULATION 299 (Edward J. Balleisen & David A. 
Moss eds., 2010); see also ERIC VON HIPPEL, DEMOCRATIZING INNOVATION (2005). For a list 
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volvement in biotechnology contribute hours of their time to solve 
protein-folding puzzles posed by Foldit, an online video game that 
uses crowd science to solve complex scientific problems.2 Data gath-
ered from volunteer bird watchers through the global orthinological 
network eBird are used to detect important environmental changes 
that might otherwise go unnoticed.3 The U.S. Air Force is harnessing 
collaborative online platforms to solicit input from students on complex 
technological problems,4 and the National Institute of Health is enlist-
ing the help of citizen scientist volunteers to collect and analyze data 
from bacteria samples as part of the American Gut project.5 All of 
these processes of crowd science rely on cooperation among many par-
ticipants with diverse motivations and skills to collectively and openly 
develop solutions to complex scientific or technological problems.6  
 Advances in technology have enabled greater computational capa-
bilities and new ways of pooling knowledge. They have facilitated the 
growth of massively distributed open access innovation processes 
that rely upon voluntary participation by large numbers of people 
who bring with them a diversity of skills and perspectives.7 These 
participants share their ideas and discoveries openly with other 
members of the innovation community in order to collectively and 
cumulatively advance the innovation process. I refer to these kinds of 
innovation processes as “cooperative innovation.” Cooperative inno-
vation can harness underutilized and unused human resources and 
combine existing disciplines and perspectives in new ways to solve 
previously intractable scientific problems. In some cases it may com-
 
of some crowd science projects, see Citizen Science, SCI. AM., http://www.scientific 
american.com/citizen-science/ (last visited Mar. 22, 2014).  
 2. See The Science Behind Foldit, FOLDIT, http://fold.it/portal/info/about (last visited 
Mar. 22, 2014).  
 3. Jim Robbins, Crowdsourcing, for the Birds, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 19, 2013), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/20/science/earth/crowdsourcing-for-the-birds.html?page 
wanted=all&_r=0 (eBird aggregates data about bird sightings that could not be collect- 
ed other than through individual observations and uses it to uncover changes in  
the environment).  
 4. Jane L. Levere, Air Force Asks Students to Solve Real World Problems, N.Y. TIMES 
(July 28, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/29/business/media/air-force-asks-stud 
ents-to-solve-real-world-problems.html.  
 5. See American Gut, HUMAN FOOD PROJECT, http://humanfoodproject.com/americangut/ 
(last visited Mar. 22, 2014). 
 6. While these and other examples of what I am calling “cooperative innovation” 
have important similarities, an equally important distinction can be drawn between 
projects that rely primarily on cooperative data gathering, such as in the eBird and 
American Gut project examples, and projects that involve cooperative problem solving and 
free sharing of ideas, such as the Foldit and U.S. Air Force examples. The concerns that I 
address in this paper apply most strongly to the latter cases, where at least some 
participants are engaging in more than collecting data, although the lines between 
activities that generate data and activities that lead to invention are often blurred. 
 7. See, e.g., VON HIPPEL, supra note 1; Benkler, supra note 1.   
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plement existing modes of market-driven innovation, and in other 
cases it may challenge them, increasing competition in important ar-
eas of intellectual production.8 However, emerging models of coopera-
tive innovation sometimes run into patent roadblocks.   
 The problems that patents pose for cooperation in processes of  
innovation are becoming difficult to ignore.9 The patent litigation 
wars between major players in the smart phone industry such as  
Apple, Samsung, Google, and Microsoft illustrate the divisive role 
that patents can play in an industry that relies upon the shared  
development and use of technology standards to achieve interopera-
bility, particularly when network effects are important. By some  
accounts Apple and Google now spend more on patent litigation than 
they do on R&D.10 These problems are even greater for systems  
of cooperative innovation such as open source software and crowd 
science. Open source software systems like Linux challenge proprie-
tary products like Microsoft Windows in the marketplace, only to  
find their viability threatened by patent lawsuits.11 Ironically,  
the open source software community finds it necessary to spend  
substantial resources acquiring patents as a way of protecting free 
software use.12 While harder to detect and measure, the problems 
 
 8. Scholars such as Yochai Benkler have argued that cooperative innovation is 
valuable in itself, offering a way of democratizing innovation. In this article I am not 
arguing that cooperative innovation is better than existing approaches, or even that 
cooperation is always good. I am simply arguing that some kinds of cooperative innovation 
have the potential to increase social welfare and deserve a chance to compete with 
alternative approaches.  
 9. See, e.g., Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Does IP Need IP? Accommodating Intellectual 
Production Outside the Intellectual Property Paradigm, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 1437 (2010) 
(describing the need to change IP law to accommodate new forms of collaborative intellec-
tual production); Aija Leiponen & Justin Byma, If You Cannot Block, You Better Run: 
Small Firms, Cooperative Innovation, and Appropriation Strategies, 38 RES. POL’Y 1478 
(2009) (“Earlier research has emphasized patents and trade secrets as key strategies of 
appropriation, yet these strategies do not appear to be very beneficial for small firms en-
gaged in cooperative innovation. These results raise policy questions regarding the func-
tionality of the existing system of intellectual property rights.”); Mark A. Lemley, The Myth 
of the Sole Inventor, 110 MICH. L. REV. 709, 709 (2012); Katherine J. Strandburg, Evolving 
Innovation Paradigms and the Global Intellectual Property Regime, 41 CONN. L. REV. 861, 
863-65 (2009) (arguing that current IP regimes are not designed to cope with changes in 
the innovative process).   
 10. See Charles Duhigg & Steve Lohr, The Patent, Used as a Sword, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 7, 
2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/08/technology/patent-wars-among-tech-giants-can-stif 
le-competition.html?pagewanted=all. 
 11. See Roger Parloff, Microsoft Takes on the Free World, FORTUNE (May 14, 2007, 9:35 
AM), available at http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/fortune_archive/2007/05/28/ 
100033867/ (“Microsoft claims that free software like Linux, which runs a big chunk of 
corporate America, violates 235 of its patents. It wants royalties from distributors and users. 
Users like you, maybe.”). 
 12. See Clark D. Asay, Enabling Patentless Innovation, MD. L. REV. (forthcoming 2014) 
(manuscript at 47-48), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_ 
id=2289326); Keith Bergelt & William Wong, Interview: Keith Bergelt Discusses Open Invention 
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that patents create for systems like Foldit that rely most heavily on 
non-market mechanisms might prove to be even more costly. Patents 
may interfere with the growth and vitality of these cooperative sys-
tems, limiting the opportunities that they provide for socially benefi-
cial intellectual production.  
 Scholars of innovation such as Yochai Benkler and Eric von Hip-
pel have already challenged us to consider what changes to the de-
sign of the legal and institutional system are necessary to sustain 
cooperative innovation.13 They have identified intellectual property 
law, particularly patent law, as threatening the open, inclusive and 
collaborative nature of these systems. But they and other scholars 
following in their wake have left the precise contours and magnitude 
of the patent threats and specific proposals for patent law change for 
further study.14 This Article responds to the challenge by identifying 
and addressing specific ways in which patent law may interfere with 
non-market mechanisms that support cooperative innovation. It fo-
cuses on three mechanisms that play a critical role in systems of co-
operative innovation: trust, benefit-sharing, and reciprocity.15 Pa-
tents interfere with these mechanisms by increasing incentives for 
group members to defect from the group and by increasing threats 
from third parties against the group. This can make it harder to sus-
tain the intrinsic motivations and the related norms of trust and shar-
ing that cooperative systems rely upon, as well as increasing the cost 
and risk of participation to potentially unsustainable levels. I argue 
that courts should take these negative effects into account when fash-
ioning patent remedies in contexts of cooperative innovation.16  
 
Network, ELEC. DESIGN (Mar. 6, 2014), http://electronicdesign.com/embedded/interview-keith-
bergelt-discusses-open-invention-network. 
 13. “Policymakers . . . can design institutions and social systems to foster cooperation 
by shaping social and psychological dynamics, rather than by focusing on individual incen-
tives. The question then becomes, what aspects of the design of an institution or system—
be it technical platform, legal rule, business process, or policy intervention—are likely to 
lead to a stable cooperative social dynamic?” Benkler, supra note 1, at 302; see also VON 
HIPPEL, supra note 1. 
 14. See Katherine J. Strandburg, Intellectual Property at the Boundary (N.Y.U. Sch. of 
Law Pub. Law & Legal Theory Res. Paper Series, Working Paper No. 13-60, 2013) (setting 
out an agenda for investigating how IP rules impact cooperative innovation systems).  
 15. While these basic mechanisms seem to capture important ways in which  
many cooperative systems operate, there are many other aspects of cooperative systems 
that distinguish them from market-based systems, including a rich variety of non-economic 
motivations and incentives for participating. For a discussion of the variety of incentives, 
as well as some of the mechanisms, driving open source software systems, see, for  
example, Stephen M. Maurer & Suzanne Scotchmer, Open Source Software: The New 
Intellectual Property Paradigm, in 1 HANDBOOK OF ECON. & INFO. SYS. 285 (Terrence 
Hendershott ed., 2006).  
 16. Preventing cooperation may, however, sometimes be socially desirable. See, e.g., F. 
Scott Kieff, On Coordinating Transactions in Intellectual Property: A Response to Smith’s 
Delineating Entitlements in Information, 117 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 101 (2007); Klaus 
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 The Article proceeds as follows. Part I explores the potential of 
cooperative innovation as an alternative to the traditional market-
driven approach. It provides two examples of cooperative innovation, 
crowd science and open source software, to illustrate both the power 
of cooperative systems and their vulnerabilities to patent threats. 
Part II examines how and why patents may create problems for coop-
erative innovation.17 Part III shows how patent law could be adapted 
to accommodate cooperative innovation through limited changes to 
patent remedies. It provides three principles for contextualizing pa-
tent remedies in ways that respond to and limit the costs of patents 
for socially beneficial cooperative innovation.18 These principles 
would be triggered and applied by the courts only in contexts of coop-
erative innovation,19 leaving other areas of patent law unchanged. 
Making room for cooperative innovation in this way will facilitate 
 
Kultti et al., Patents Hinder Collusion (Helsinki Ctr. of Econ. Res., Discussion Paper No. 
144, 2007); see also Jonathan Barnett, Dynamic Analysis of Intellectual Property: Theory, 
Evidence and Policy (USC Gould Sch. of Law Ctr. in Law, Econ. & Org. Res. Papers Series, 
Research Paper No. C13-4, 2013) (noting that periods of weak patent protection may actu-
ally disadvantage new entrants).    
 17. See, e.g., Dreyfuss, supra note 9; see also Gregory N. Mandel, Left-Brain Versus 
Right-Brain: Competing Conceptions of Creativity in Intellectual Property Law, 44 U.C. 
DAVIS L. REV. 283 (2010) (noting IP law has failed to recognize insights from psychology, 
neurobiology and cultural research about how to promote creativity, resulting in laws 
based on distorting stereotypes of creativity); Gregory N. Mandel, To Promote the Creative 
Process: Intellectual Property Law and the Psychology of Creativity, 86 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 1999, 2000 (2011) (noting patents may have psychological effects that alter incentives 
to innovate, particularly in collaborations); Michael Mattioli, Communities of Innovation, 
106 NW. U. L. REV. 103, 103 (2012) (examining collective patent licensing as a form of col-
lective behavior in the patent system). 
 18. For discussions of the need for principles to guide policy determinations about 
patent remedies, see, for example, Thomas F. Cotter, Four Principles for Calculating 
Reasonable Royalties in Patent Infringement Litigation, 27 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & 
HIGH TECH. L.J. 725 (2011); John M. Golden, Principles for Patent Remedies, 88 TEX. L. 
REV. 505 (2010) (providing principles to guide policymakers in assessing the relative merits 
of alternative policy proposals); Paul J. Heald, Optimal Remedies for Patent Infringement: 
A Transactional Model (Univ. of Chi. Law Sch. John M. Olin Law & Econ., Working Paper 
No. 431, 2008), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1278062. 
 19. The literature includes an increasing number of proposals for tailoring patent 
remedies in ways that take the public interest in supporting innovation into account. See, 
e.g., Sarah R. Wasserman Rajec, Tailoring Remedies to Spur Innovation, 61 AM. U. L. REV. 
733 (2012); Ted Sichelman, Purging Patent Law of ‘Private Law’ Remedies, 92 TEX. L. REV. 
517 (2014); Samson Vermont, Basing Patent Remedies on Harm to the World Instead of 
Harm to the Patentee (May 12, 2012) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). It also 
includes proposals for tailoring patent remedies to reflect the relational or transactional 
aspects of patents. See, e.g., Thomas F. Cotter, Patent Holdup, Patent Remedies, and 
Antitrust Responses, 34 J. CORP. L. 1151 (2009) (focusing on the relational value of patents 
and the importance of employing practical reason as an approach to patent remedies); 
Heald, supra note 18, at 1176 (stating that the goal of patent remedies is to provide 
incentives for efficient transactions to occur while minimizing cost of transacting). 
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competition among alternative modes of innovation without material-
ly undermining the patent system.20    
II.   AN ALTERNATIVE WAY OF INNOVATING  
“Gettin’ good players is easy. Gettin’ ‘em to play together is the hard 
part.”—Casey Stengel 
 In a controversial presidential campaign speech, now known as 
the “you didn’t build that” speech, President Obama told his audience 
that “[i]f you were successful, somebody along the line gave you some 
help,” referring to the essential role of shared infrastructure and col-
lective knowledge in supporting individual achievement.21 Since then, 
Obama has continued to challenge the image of the rugged individual 
inventor and entrepreneur, emphasizing the social context in which 
innovation takes place and the importance of cumulative contribu-
tions to business success.22 An emphasis on collaboration and cooper-
ation among stakeholders is now evident in both federal and state 
innovation policies.23  
 While the need for collaboration to solve scientific and technologi-
cal problems is not new,24 what is new is the scale and complexity of 
the problems that need to be solved and the large and diverse group 
of people who can come together to solve them using decentralized, 
 
 20. I am not arguing that patents are always bad for cooperation. Patents may be 
useful, even essential, in supporting certain kinds of coordination and cooperation in 
innovation. See, e.g., Jonathan M. Barnett, The Illusion of the Commons, 25 BERKELEY 
TECH. L.J. 1751 (2010) [hereinafter Barnett, The Illusion of the Commons]; Paul J. Heald, 
A Transaction Costs Theory of Patent Law, 66 OHIO ST. L.J. 473 (2005); F. Scott Kieff, 
Coordination, Property, and Intellectual Property: An Unconventional Approach to 
Anticompetitive Effects and Downstream Access, 56 EMORY L.J. 327 (2006). Moreover, firms 
have alternative appropriability strategies that they can use in place of patents, so 
weakening patents may not necessarily mean greater access. See, e.g., Jonathan M. 
Barnett, Is Intellectual Property Trivial?, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1691 (2009). I argue only that 
patents create systematic disadvantages for certain kinds of cooperative innovation that 
provide social benefits such as lower cost innovation, competition with existing proprietary 
systems, or the creation of new products and ideas that might otherwise be unavailable.  
 21. This speech now has its own spot on Wikipedia. See a full discussion of this and 
related speeches at You Didn’t Build That, WIKIPEDIA.ORG, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ 
You_didn’t_ build_that (last modified Jan. 19, 2014). 
 22. SEE BARACK OBAMA, U.S. PRESIDENT, REMARKS AT A CAMPAIGN EVENT IN ROANOKE, 
VIRGINIA (JULY 13, 2012) (TRANSCRIPT AVAILABLE AT HTTP://WWW.WHITEHOUSE.GOV/THE-PRESS-
OFFICE/2012/07/13/REMARKS-PRESIDENT-CAMPAIGN-EVENT-ROANOKE-VIRGINIA). 
 23. See, e.g., Steven C. Currall & Ed Frauenheim, How the U.S. Can Lead on 
Technological Innovation, SEATTLE TIMES (Mar. 7, 2014, 5:14 PM), http://seattle 
times.com/html/opinion/2023076667_stevencurralledfrauenheimopedinnovationresearchxx
xml.html; Bruce Katz & Judith Rodin, Innovative State and City Government Solutions to 
Watch in 2012, THE ATLANTIC (Jan. 17, 2012), http://www.theatlanticcities.com/jobs-and-
economy/ 2012/01/innovative-local-government-solutions-watch-2012/951/.   
 24. See generally Ernan McMullin, Openness and Secrecy in Science: Some Notes on 
Early History, 10 SCI. TECH. & HUMAN VALUES 14 (1985) (examining the history of the 
ideal and reality of open science). 
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low-cost, web-based technologies. Emerging forms of cooperative  
innovation can harness new resources, bring multiple disciplines and 
perspectives to bear on previously intractable scientific problems, 
and increase competition in key areas of intellectual production.  
I argue that innovation policies need to respond to the opportunities 
of these cooperative innovation systems. To do so, however, requires 
an understanding of how these systems diverge from traditional 
market-driven modes of innovation in ways that leave them vulnera-
ble to patents. I therefore explore the mechanisms on which coopera-
tive systems of innovation rely and the potential effects of patents  
on these mechanisms. Two examples of cooperative innovation help 
to illustrate both the power of these models and their vulnerability  
to patents.  
A.   Distinct Features of Cooperative Innovation 
“[W]hat really distinguishes open source is not just source, but an 
‘architecture of participation’ . . . .”—Tim O’Reilly 
 Cooperative innovation is used in this article to refer to open ac-
cess innovation processes fueled by the voluntary participation of 
large numbers of people who share their ideas and discoveries freely 
and openly with other members of the innovation community. Entry 
is free, or close to free, and the cost to participate is low. Progress is 
highly sequential and dependent upon large numbers of small steps 
that build upon each other. This kind of innovation diverges from 
traditional market-based modes of innovation in its reliance on non-
market mechanisms for sustaining cooperation.  
 Cooperation involves working together to advance common goals 
or obtain mutual benefits. It can occur among even purely selfish 
economically rational actors where individual economic interests 
align with the collective interest. Sustaining cooperation when indi-
vidual economic interests diverge from the interests of the collective 
is more challenging. A number of studies have tried to identify the 
factors that are needed to sustain cooperation beyond situations in 
which rational economic actors have aligned interests.25 Case studies 
 
 25. See, e.g., YOCHAI BENKLER, THE PENGUIN AND THE LEVIATHAN (2011); SOCIAL 
DILEMMAS: PERSPECTIVES ON INDIVIDUALS AND GROUPS (David A. Schroeder ed., 1995) 
(giving an overview of different perspectives on decisions made by those in social dilemmas 
and the factors that influence choices to act in the interests of the group); Benkler, supra 
note 1; see also ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE 
DISPUTES (1991); ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF 
INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION (1990); Elinor Ostrom, A General Framework for 
Analyzing Sustainability of Social-Ecological Systems, 325 SCI. 419 (2009). For an 
organizational approach to understanding how patents influence knowledge communities, 
see, for example, Fiona Murray & Scott Stern, Learning To Live with Patents: A Dynamic 
Model of a Knowledge Community’s Response to Legal Institutional Change (Nov. 2008) 
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).  
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of open source software communities have been particularly helpful 
in identifying the mechanisms that support cooperative intellectual 
production.26 They have illustrated the importance of trust and reci-
procity, and shown how these mechanisms can work when groups 
become large and relationships attenuated.  
 In open source software communities, people cooperate with each 
other even when they do not know each other and their interactions 
are limited. Team members must decide how much they can trust 
each other before joining the team and without the chance to estab-
lish personal relationships or forms of mutual control.27 Instead of 
personal relationships, the decision to join the team is based on be-
liefs about the motivation of other team members to adhere to the 
mutual norms of the open source software community. Participants 
must believe that other members of the community will continue to 
act in ways that are consistent with the open source model of free 
sharing. This is an example of swift trust, a unique form of trust that 
occurs between people or groups who come together in temporary 
teams to solve collaborative tasks.28 The maintenance of these com-
munities depends on “their ability to a) develop and enforce rules of 
cooperation in a self-organized manner, and to b) develop self-
enforcing swift trust which is based on generalized reciprocity be-
tween group members.”29 Keeping the cost of participation low is also 
essential to the sustainability of these groups.30  
 A growing body of empirical work in other areas involving self-
governing systems of cooperative resource management and use sup-
ports these findings, emphasizing the importance of trust—
particularly swift trust, benefit-sharing, and reciprocity in attracting 
 
 26. See, e.g., Greg R. Vetter, Commercial Free and Open Source Software: Knowledge 
Production, Hybrid Appropriability, and Patents, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2087 (2009).  
 27. See Margit Osterloh & Sandra Rota, Trust and Community in Open Source Soft-
ware Production, 26 ANALYSE & KRITIK 279 (2004). 
 28. For early development and use of “swift trust,” see, for example, Debra Meyerson 
et al., Swift Trust and Temporary Groups, in TRUST IN ORGANIZATIONS 166, 168 (Roderick 
M. Kramer & Tom R. Tyler eds., 1996). For an interesting discussion of swift trust as it 
arises in different contexts and the factors affecting its formation, see Michael J. Fahy, 
Understanding “Swift Trust” To Improve Interagency Collaboration in New York City 
(Sept. 2012) (unpublished M.A. thesis, Naval Postgraduate School), available at 
http://hdl.handle.net/10945/17362. 
 29. Osterloh & Rota, supra note 27, at 280; see also C. Brad Crisp & Sirkaa L. Jar-
venpaa, Swift Trust in Global Virtual Teams: Trusting Beliefs and Normative Actions, 12 J. 
PERSONNEL PSYCHOL. 45 (2013) (examining the role and vulnerabilities of swift trust in ad 
hoc global virtual teams). 
 30. Copyright law has provided a limited enforcement mechanism, through the use of 
licenses that impose varying commitments on users of open source software to make their 
own contributions open and accessible. Even with these licenses in place, however, trust 
remains an important part of sustaining open source software systems.  
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and sustaining participation.31 This work also suggests that to sus-
tain cooperation, laws need to be applied in ways that support, or at 
the very least minimize interference with, the norms, customs, and 
organizational structures that support these critical non-market 
mechanisms.32 Where members of a group are contributing their time 
and ideas freely and voluntarily, their willingness to participate will 
be influenced by the behavior of other group members and even, to a 
lesser extent, by the behavior of non-group members.33 Their willing-
ness to make contributions will depend on the extent to which other 
group members act in accordance with shared group norms and recip-
rocate with their own contributions and the extent to which the contri-
butions that group members freely provide remain free. Free riding 
and private appropriation of the benefits produced in the group by 
people outside of the group may also undermine internal motivations 
to contribute. Problems may arise for the group where legal rules or 
the incentives that these rules create undermine or conflict with the 
shared understandings and commitments of the group, leading to de-
viations from accepted and expected cooperative behavior. 
 These insights are making their way into at least some areas of 
the law. In contract law, for example, relational contract theory pro-
vides a view of contracts as relations rather than discrete transac-
tions, with many of the contract terms left implicit and governed by 
trust between the parties.34 Recent work on contracts and innovation 
illustrates how firms use incomplete contracts to sustain cooperative 
relationships in the face of imperfect information.35 In corporate law, 
 
 31. See, e.g., TRUST AND RECIPROCITY: INTERDISCIPLINARY LESSONS FROM EXPERIMENTAL 
RESEARCH (Elinor Ostrom & James Walker eds., 2003); UNDERSTANDING KNOWLEDGE AS A 
COMMONS (Charlotte Hess & Elinor Ostrom eds., 2007); STEVEN WEBER, THE SUCCESS OF 
OPEN SOURCE (2004); Benkler, supra note 1; Dan M. Kahan, The Logic of Reciprocity: Trust, 
Collective Action, and Law, 102 MICH. L. REV. 71 (2003); Osterloh & Rota, supra note 27; Mar-
git Osterloh, Sandra Rota & Bernhard Kuster, Trust and Commerce in Open Source—A Con-
tradiction? (Nov. 22, 2002) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.research 
gate.net/publication/226907215_Trust_and_Commerce_in_Open_Source_A_Contradiction.  
 32. See, e.g., TRUST AND RECIPROCITY: INTERDISCIPLINARY LESSONS FROM EXPERIMENTAL 
RESEARCH, supra note 31; UNDERSTANDING KNOWLEDGE AS A COMMONS, supra note 31. 
 33. See, e.g., Osterloh, Rota & Kuster, supra note 31, at 9.  
 34. See, e.g., Ian R. Macneil, The Many Futures of Contract, 47 S. CAL. L. REV. 691 (1974). 
 35. See, e.g., Ronald J. Gilson et al., Contracting for Innovation: Vertical 
Disintegration and Interfirm Collaboration, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 431 (2009). Contracts 
allow parties to structure their relationships with each other in ways that foster trust and 
facilitate relationship-specific investments where the payoffs from the relationship cannot 
be predicted and contracted for in advance. In some cases the terms governing the division 
of payoffs from a shared innovation project are left open, the parties relying instead on the 
braiding of formal terms for sharing information about the progress and prospects of their 
joint activities with informal terms governing subsequent outcomes of the joint work. This 
information-sharing regime “braids” together the formal and informal elements of the 
contract in a way that endogenizes the growth of trust between the participants. See 
Ronald J. Gilson et al., Braiding: The Interaction of Formal and Informal Contracting in 
Theory, Practice, and Doctrine, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1377 (2010). 
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behavioral theories based on trust and trustworthiness challenge 
conventional views of the firm.36 This work cautions against excessive 
reliance on external sanctions that may undermine internal trust.37 
As new forms of collective production emerge, there have even been 
suggestions for creating an entirely new field of law, cooperation law, 
to reflect arrangements between people that are based on a variety of 
modes of sharing, cooperation, and collaboration—such as co-housing, 
barter, and community-financed businesses.38 These legal responses 
aim to modify existing formal rules where needed to support and pro-
tect beneficial informal rules and understandings. I suggest that in-
ternalizing the negative effects that patents may have on non-market 
mechanisms of trust, benefit-sharing, and reciprocity in cooperative 
systems will begin to pull similar considerations into patent law in 
contexts, such as those described below, where they are most im-
portant.39 The following two examples illustrate both the power of 
cooperative innovation and the vulnerabilities of such systems to the 
incentives and associated transaction costs that patents create.  
B.   Two Examples 
 1.   Crowd Science: The Example of Foldit 
 The power of crowd science, the use of many volunteers working 
together to solve complex data intensive problems, has been illus-
trated in areas as diverse as finding planets, deciphering ancient 
texts, and building climate models.40 Crowd science is increasingly 
informing what we know about diverse natural phenomena such as 
bird populations and their distributions,41 the pollination habits of 
 
 36. See, e.g., Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of 
Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247 (1999); Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Trust, 
Trustworthiness, and the Behavioral Foundations of Corporate Law, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 
1735 (2001) [hereinafter Blair & Stout, Trust] (arguing that the behavioral phenomena of 
internalized trust and trustworthiness play important roles in encouraging cooperation 
within firms); Donald C. Langevoort, Behavioral Approaches to Corporate Law, in 
RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF CORPORATE LAW 442 (Claire A. Hill & Brett 
H. McDonnell eds., 2012).  
 37. See Blair & Stout, Trust, supra note 36.  
 38. See, e.g., Janelle Orsi, Cooperation Law for a Sharing Economy, YES! MAG. (Sept. 23, 
2010), http://www.yesmagazine.org/new-economy/cooperation-law-for-a-sharing-economy (“A 
new sharing economy is emerging—but how does it fit within our legal system? Time for a 
whole new field of cooperation law.”). 
 39. For a discussion of how IP operates at the boundaries between groups, see, for 
example, Strandburg, supra note 14.  
 40. GAMING FOR THE GREATER GOOD, http://gamingforthegreatergood.com (last visited 
Mar. 22, 2014).  
 41. The Audubon Society’s Christmas Bird Count began in 1900. A transformed 
version, eBird, was launched in 2002 by Cornell Lab of Ornithology in collaboration with 
the National Audubon Society. About eBird, EBIRD, http://ebird.org/content/ebird/about/ 
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bees,42 and the surface of the moon,43 and is also helping to solve puz-
zles in quantum physics,44 the anthropology of microbes,45 and the 
early development stages of dinosaurs.46 These divergent crowd sci-
ence projects share a common foundation built upon open access, 
sharing, and cooperation between many heterogeneous participants 
with diverse motivations that may not be consistent with a price-
based system. They illustrate the opportunities that cooperation out-
side of the marketplace offer for scaling up the collection and analysis 
of large amounts of data and for building knowledge through the ac-
cumulation of many incremental contributions of information and ide-
as.47 Unfortunately they also share common vulnerabilities to a patent 
system that is not designed with them in mind. The story of Foldit, a 
particularly promising citizen science project, highlights both the risks 
and opportunities of these kinds of cooperative innovation.48   
 This story starts with the creation of a video game called Foldit 
that anybody can play.49 Within ten days of their start on December 
16, 2010, players of this new online protein folding game were able to 
solve the protein structure of a retrovirus similar to HIV, a structure 
that had eluded scientists for over ten years.50 The results provided 
scientists with important insights into the treatment of AIDS and 
were published in a scientific journal with the video game team play-
ers as co-authors.51 This is only one of a number of scientific advances 
made by Foldit players. Other contributions by Foldit players include 
 
(last visited Mar. 22, 2014). eBird collects bird abundance and distribution data and enlists 
public participation in analyzing the over eighty million observations. See id. 
 42. The Great Sunflower Project was started by a single academic researcher 
interested in examining the pollination activities of bees, and it now has 90,000 registered 
volunteers planting sunflowers and taking observation samples. See GREAT SUNFLOWER 
PROJECT, http://www.greatsunflower.org (last visited Mar. 22, 2014). 
 43. See, e.g., Moon Zoo, ZOONIVERSE, https://www.zooniverse.org/project/moonzoo (last 
visited Mar. 22, 2014). 
 44. See, e.g., The Story Behind “Quantum Moves,” SCI. HOME, http://www.science 
athome.org (last visited Mar. 22, 2014) (describing Quantum Moves, a game that uses 
community efforts to help build a quantum computer). 
 45. See American Gut, supra note 5. 
 46. See OPEN DINOSAUR PROJECT, http://opendino.wordpress.com/ (last modified  
May 17, 2013). 
 47. See, e.g., Clay Shirky, How the Internet Will (One Day) Transform Government, 
Address at TED Conference (June 2012), available at http://www.ted.com/talks/clay_ 
shirky_how_the_internet_will_one_day_transform_government. 
 48. See, e.g., Eric Hand, People Power, 466 NATURE 685 (2010) (discussing projects 
involving the concept of distributed thinking, featuring Foldit); Collins Kilgore, Gaming for the 
Greater Good, VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. (Sept. 27, 2011), http://www.jetlaw.org/?p=8381.  
 49. See FOLDIT, http://fold.it/portal/ (last visited Mar. 22, 2014).  
 50. See Firas Khatib et al., Crystal Structure of a Monomeric Retroviral Protease 
Solved by Protein Folding Game Players, 18 NATURE STRUCTURAL & MOLECULAR 
BIOLOGY 1175, 1177 (2011).  
 51. Id. 
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the discovery of a unique enzyme “backbone” configuration for the 
development of novel enzymes, a discovery described by scientists as 
the most detailed remodeling of a protein structure by humans work-
ing through a computer-based process.52 This work moves beyond 
protein folding, which is critical for understanding how the human 
body works, and into the realm of protein design, which holds prom-
ise for advancing drug discovery. The protein design results were 
published in Nature Biotechnology, a prestigious scientific journal, 
with Foldit Players again included in the author list.53  
 Foldit was developed by David Baker, a protein research scientist 
at the University of Washington, together with Zoran Povic and Seth 
Cooper, computer scientists at the same university. The program is 
supported through a collaboration between the Biochemistry De-
partment and the Center for Game Science at the University of 
Washington.54 The vision behind Foldit is one of enabling public par-
ticipation in large-scale distributed science. The project “aims to pre-
dict, design, and understand biochemical structures, and study how 
humans and computers can best work together to further these aims” 
through a growing community of game-developed expert volunteers.55 
Anybody can play the game simply by visiting the Foldit website, 
consenting to user-friendly terms of use that focus primarily on ex-
plaining how information is collected and shared, and downloading 
the free software needed to play the game.56  
 Participants in the game, most of who have little or no background 
in biochemistry, are introduced to some basic concepts of protein fold-
ing and then engaged in solving “puzzles” designed around specific 
protein structure problems that have been identified but not solved 
by scientists. The players collaborate with teammates while compet-
ing against other players to obtain the highest-scoring (lowest-
energy) models. The scoring system includes different categories 
based on levels and types of contributions. The website identifies the 
 
 52. See Christopher B. Eiben et al., Increased Diels-Alderase Activity Through Back-
bone Remodeling Guided by Foldit Players, 30 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 190, 192 (2012); 
see also David Baker, More Amazing FoldIt Results and New Flu Virus Challenges, FOLDIT 
(May 27, 2011, 6:41 PM), http://fold.it/portal/node/989769; Zoran, Recent Exciting Discover-
ies by Foldit, FOLDIT (Apr. 19, 2011, 5:15 PM), http://fold.it/portal/node/989576.  
 53. See Eiben et al., supra note 52 (showing that Foldit Players are included on the 
publication list; reporting the use of game-driven crowdsourcing to enhance the activity of 
a computationally designed enzyme through the functional remodeling of its structure). 
 54. See CENTER GAME SCI., http://centerforgamescience.com/site/ (last visited  
Mar. 22, 2014). 
 55. See Foldit Terms of Service and Consent, FOLDIT, http://fold.it/portal/legal (last 
updated Mar. 8, 2013). 
 56. New players begin by loading the game and watching tutorials that explain the 
game and the scientific concepts needed to understand it. See How To Download and Start 
Playing Foldit!, FOLDIT (Nov. 9, 2010, 11:47 PM), http://fold.it/portal/node/988864. 
2014]  COOPERATIVE INNOVATION 1079 
 
 
top players in each category and for each puzzle. It also provides 
rankings based on global scores and a hall of fame for the very top 
scorers. The game has separate rankings for soloists, who work on 
their projects alone, and evolvers, who work on and improve solutions 
that have been shared with other people. A high ranking is valued 
and sought after by the active players, and many of them carefully 
watch the scores and study the ways in which the rankings are calcu-
lated. Players are quick to point out areas where they believe the 
scoring is not accurately reflecting good performance or otherwise 
seems unfair.57   
 Three years into the life of the Foldit games, there is clear evi-
dence that this massively multiplayer online game, which enlists 
players worldwide to solve challenging protein-structure prediction 
problems, offers improvements over the computational models cur-
rently being used by scientists.58 “Obsessive gamers’ hours at the 
computer have now topped scientists’ efforts to improve a model en-
zyme, in what researchers say is the first crowd sourced redesign of a 
protein.”59 The use of games offers valuable ways for engaging citizen 
scientists, drawing on the vast amounts of free time that people are 
willing to devote to problem solving just because they want to. “[T]he 
average young person today in a country with a strong gamer culture 
will have spent 10,000 hours playing online games by the age of 
twenty-one. . . . [C]ollectively all the World of Warcraft gamers have 
spent 5.93 million years solving the virtual problems of [that particu-
lar game world].”60 Foldit harnesses this energy to solve difficult and 
data-intensive problems, serving as the flagship game for the concept 
of using crowds to solve complex scientific problems.61  
 This system of intellectual production relies upon non-market 
mechanisms of trust, benefit-sharing, and reciprocity. While the 
game is structured as a competition to get the highest score, competi-
 
 57. See, e.g., Bruno Kestemont, Actual Competitors for the Global Score, FOLDIT (Oct. 
25, 2013, 9:46 AM), http://fold.it/portal/node/996160. 
 58. See Seth Cooper et al., Predicting Protein Structures with a Multiplayer Online 
Game, 466 NATURE 756, 756 (2010). 
 59. Jessica Marshall, Victory for Crowdsourced Biomolecule Design: Players of the 
Online Game Foldit Guide Researchers to a Better Enzyme, NATURE (Jan. 22, 2012), 
http://www.nature.com/news/victory-for-crowdsourced-biomolecule-design-1.9872. 
 60. See Jane McGonigal, Gaming Can Make a Better World, Address at TED Conference 
(Feb. 2010) (emphasis added), available at http://www.ted.com/talks/jane_mcgonigal_gaming_ 
can_make_a_better_world.  
 61. See, e.g., John Walker, The Inaugural Horace Awards for Forgotten IGF Entrants, 
ROCK, PAPER, SHOTGUN (Jan. 8, 2013, 9:00 PM), http://www.rockpapershotgun.com/2013/ 
01/08/the-inaugural-horace-awards-for-forgotten-igf-entrants/ (discussing the Foldit game in 
the wake of results on the winners of the Fifteenth Annual Independent Games Festival, 
which is well known in the video game industry, and suggesting it should be recognized with 
the Horace Award for Actually Advancing Science). 
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tion among the players is moderated by the fact that there are no 
monetary consequences attached to having a winning score. Moreo-
ver, the results of gameplay are portrayed as contributions to the 
public domain of scientific knowledge. The Foldit site explains that 
diversity advances this knowledge, so even those with lower scores 
feel they are doing something important. The low-level incentives to 
win are combined with norms of sharing and open communication to 
foster a collaborative environment.62 Members are encouraged to 
communicate, share ideas, and troubleshoot through the Foldit blog, 
forum, wiki, or through sharing “recipes” useful in solving various 
puzzles. The importance of sharing as a fundamental value for the 
community is highlighted in the Foldit Terms of Service, which re-
mind members that: “We are sharing what we learn with others from 
all over the world. That is how science is done. We have to share so 
others can learn, too.”63 Reciprocity in the exchange of ideas is also 
encouraged. It is encouraged through member interests in sustaining 
a robust forum for troubleshooting and a library of shared recipes to 
advance gameplay. There is also a built-in reciprocal exchange be-
tween the players and Foldit. With the consent of the players, the 
Foldit project continuously gathers and analyzes gameplay data such 
as biochemical structures, algorithms, and tool and algorithm usage 
that may have research benefits, and in return the project agrees to 
give attribution to the players who make discoveries and to make 
these discoveries publicly available.   
 Out of this collective effort has come publishable results and novel 
discoveries.64 While scientific publications co-authored by video game 
players may seem unusual, this could become the norm in at least 
some areas of science if crowd science continues to progress at its 
current rate. The Foldit community is large and growing. In January 
2012, the game had 240,000 registered players and approximately 
2200 active players.65 In January 2014 the game appears to have al-
most doubled this number of registered players and more than dou-
bled the number of active players.66 The game continues to expand 
not just its number of players, but also the reach of its problem-
solving power. Most recently, the creators of the game have turned 
their eyes to the design of new therapeutic enzymes and even small 
 
 62. Foldit community rules can be found online at Community Rules, FOLDIT, 
http://fold.it/portal/communityrules (last updated Apr. 18, 2013). 
 63. Foldit Terms of Service and Consent, supra note 55. 
 64. See, e.g., Khatib et al., supra note 49, at 1175 (listing authors as including the 
“Foldit Contenders Group” and the “Foldit Void Crushers Group”). 
 65. Marshall, supra note 59 (noting that active players are players who have logged in 
and been active on the web site within the last week as measured on a particular day).  
 66. See Top Evolvers, FOLDIT, http://fold.it/portal/players (last visited Mar. 22, 2014). 
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molecule design, taking the crowdsourcing approach into the realm of 
drug development.67  
 As puzzles move into areas with more direct commercial potential, 
however, tensions between the non-market mechanisms on which 
Foldit relies and proprietary interests enabled by patenting are likely 
to emerge. Analogies can be drawn to the tensions that have emerged 
in many areas of academic science as the distinction between re-
search and commercial application has blurred.68 During its first few 
years the Foldit website provided little information on intellectual 
property ownership, not seeing it as something that was needed. In 
response to queries by its participants, the site administra-
tors/founders stated that the “Foldit project was initiated with the 
goal of democratizing science, and we stand behind that. [T]he pro-
cess of discovery and the eventual results of game play will all be 
open domain.”69 In line with the original game philosophy of demo-
cratic science, the founders of the game then asked the game partici-
pants for their views on intellectual property ownership. Developer 
chat discussions in 2012 were used to flesh out what a Foldit intellec-
tual property ownership policy should look like.70   
 The community discussions about intellectual property ownership 
raised a number of important issues about how patents might impact 
Foldit. Some Foldit members focused on negative effects that patent-
ing of results might have on the intrinsic motivations and norms of 
sharing that motivate the game. They expressed the view that Foldit 
is a public, volunteer-driven process, and therefore all ideas and con-
tributions should remain public.71 Others focused more on the chal-
lenges of benefit-sharing in a system that works best when it is col-
laborative and invites cumulative refinements of ideas by competing 
members of the game. Many of the contributions take the form of 
computer recipes for improving game play, contributions which may 
 
 67. Rebecca Hersher, FoldIt Game’s Next Play: Crowdsourcing Better Drug Design, 
SPOONFUL OF MEDICINE, NATURE MED. (Apr. 13, 2012, 4:35 PM), http://blogs.nature.com/ 
spoonful/2012/04/foldit-games-next-play-crowdsourcing-better-drug-design.html?WT.mc_id= 
TWT_NatureBlogs. 
 68. See, e.g., Robert P. Merges, Property Rights Theory and the Commons: The Case of 
Scientific Research, in SCIENTIFIC INNOVATION, PHILOSOPHY, AND PUBLIC POLICY 145 
(Ellen Frankel Paul, Fred D. Miller, Jr. & Jeffrey Paul eds., 1996). I have explored the 
challenges that patents create in biomedical research at greater length. Liza Vertinsky, 
Universities as Guardians of Their Inventions, 2012 UTAH L. REV. 1949. 
 69. Zoran, Comment to Set My Mind at Ease, FOLDIT (Mar. 22, 2009, 3:31 AM), 
http://fold.it/portal/node/267249. 
 70. See Developer Chat, FOLDIT (June 1, 2012), http://fold.it/portal/node/992849. 
 71. See, e.g., GlaciusCool, Comment to Foldit Ownership Policy, FOLDIT (May 31, 2012, 
1:25 AM), http://fold.it/portal/node/992792 (“That which is created by the public should remain 
in the hands of the public for the benefit of all human kind. Scientific discovery—even if it’s 
just a molecular recipe—should be used by and available to all who seek the knowledge.”). 
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not themselves be patentable or serve as patent-invalidating prior art 
but which could lead to the discovery of something that is. Partici-
pants might not be willing to share their recipes freely if they 
thought that someone else could use them to make and appropriate 
results for private commercial gain. Other issues raised by Foldit 
members focused on the practical challenges, transaction costs, and 
administrative headaches that patents might create. Participants 
worried about what formula would be used to allocate rights in a way 
that fairly rewarded performance, and whether it would be possible 
to discern who the co-inventors of an invention are in the context of 
cumulative contributions. The possibility that some contributions 
might come from employees with preexisting obligations to their 
companies created a further layer of complexity and concern.   
 Ultimately, the Foldit administrators proposed the following own-
ership provision, guided no doubt by the University of Washington 
Center for Commercialization:  
Scientific discoveries will be made publicly available and the Uni-
versity of Washington will handle ownership of discoveries. All 
significant scientific discoveries (such as structures, algorithms, 
etc) made in game will be made publicly available. In the event 
that some discoveries may warrant patent protection, University of 
Washington will handle the patent application process. US patent 
law will govern IP attribution for each discovery. Individual play-
ers who contributed to the discovery will be considered co-
inventors for any discovery produced through play.72  
A few things are notable about this policy. First, the University of 
Washington plays a direct role in managing patent choices. The Uni-
versity of Washington has an active technology transfer center, the 
Center for Commercialization, and its intellectual property policies 
and licensing practices reflect traditional assumptions about patent-
ing and technology transfer. The University’s intellectual property 
policies are “intended to show the University’s positive attitude to-
ward transfer of results of its research to the private sector” and are 
based on the assumption that “it is generally in the best interests of 
the University and the public that patents be obtained and/or licens-
es granted.”73 This approach conflicts with one focused on the free 
and open sharing and use of ideas.  
 
 72. Foldit Terms of Service and Consent, supra note 55; see also Seth Cooper, Comment to 
Foldit Ownership Policy, FOLDIT (June 4, 2012, 5:48 PM), http://fold.it/portal/node/992792 
(announcing a draft ownership policy). 
 73. PRESIDENT OF THE UNIV. OF WASH., EXEC. ORD. NO. 37: PATENT, INVENTION, AND 
COPYRIGHT POLICY (last updated Oct. 27, 2003), available at http://www.washington.edu/ 
admin/rules/policies/PO/EO36.html. 
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 Second, while the implication is that inventors will be the owners 
of their inventions, the policy is not clear about what rights the Uni-
versity will have, what rights the inventors will have, and what re-
strictions will be imposed on participant inventors who end up with 
ownership rights over a patented invention. The policy indicates only 
that the University will handle ownership and that significant scien-
tific discoveries will be made publicly available. Perhaps in response 
to concerns about the sustainability of a public domain approach, the 
Foldit developers, who are University of Washington employees, have 
announced to the Foldit community that they have committed to as-
sign all proceeds from any patents on inventions that they discover 
back to the development of the Foldit community.     
 Third, although the policy provides that “[i]ndividual players who 
contributed to the discovery will be considered co-inventors for any 
discovery produced through play,”74 joint inventorship is determined 
solely by patent law.75 In some cases, individuals might think that 
they are co-inventors when they are not, since the statutory defini-
tion of joint inventorship is narrower than the policy suggests.76 
 Finally, the Foldit Terms of Service can be changed at any time, 
leaving the University to reconsider its stance on ownership should 
the Foldit game start to yield results that are commercially lucrative. 
 While the concerns of the Foldit members have yet to be realized, 
the potential of the game to aid in areas of commercial interest, such 
as drug discovery, will inevitably increase tensions between the sys-
tem of volunteer contributions and sharing on the one hand and pa-
tenting and revenue sharing on the other hand.77 One of the remark-
 
 74. Foldit Terms of Service and Consent, supra note 55. 
 75. Joint inventorship is legally determined under patent law based on involvement 
by each inventor in the original conception of the invention. See, e.g., Burroughs Wellcome 
Co. v. Barr Labs. Inc., 40 F.3d 1223, 1227 (Fed. Cir. 1994). The contributor must have in 
mind and be contributing to the idea of the complete and operative invention, which would 
require knowledge of the entire invention and not just an understanding that some kind of 
discovery is likely to result. Reducing the invention to practice, while a valuable 
contribution, is not an inventorship contribution. Id. at 1228. While each joint inventor 
must contribute to the conception of the invention, it is enough to contribute to one claim. 
35 U.S.C. § 116 (2012). While there must be some element of joint behavior involved, a 
loose collaboration, “working under common direction,” or even “one inventor seeing a 
relevant report and building upon it,” may be enough. Kimberly-Clark Corp. v. Procter & 
Gamble Distrib. Co., 973 F.2d 911, 916-17 (Fed. Cir. 1992). If joint inventorship has 
occurred, the U.S. patent application must name all of the inventors. In the absence of any 
agreement to the contrary, the joint inventors are joint owners of the patent and can 
independently exploit the benefits of the patent. 35 U.S.C. § 262 (2012).  
 76. For an interesting discussion of some of the problems caused by this disconnect 
between common understandings and legal definitions of joint inventorship, see Aaron 
Fellmeth, Conception and Misconception in Joint Inventorship, 2 N.Y.U. J. INTELL. PROP. & 
ENT. L. 73, 77-78 (2012).  
 77. See, e.g., Merges, supra note 68 (noting the tensions that patents create in 
academic science).  
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able features of the Foldit community is the willingness of game 
players to share the recipes that they develop to solve protein struc-
ture puzzles.78 This sharing helps to sustain the evolvers, who copy 
and build on the game strategies used by others, and also aids the 
general population of game players. These recipes function like re-
search tools, serving as critical inputs into the processes that lead to 
discoveries about protein folding without describing such discoveries 
or being independently patentable.  
 The ability to patent a discovery that may have commercial value 
will make participants less willing to share their game strategies for 
a number of reasons. First, participants will be less willing to reveal 
game strategies, including the software code that enables these 
strategies, if there is a chance that a third party will take this infor-
mation and use it to make proprietary discoveries that are not in 
turn shared with the group. The nature of the information that is 
shared in the exchange of recipes is unlikely to give these partici-
pants any claim as a joint inventor and is unlikely to constitute prior 
art, leaving them with little ability to either block the patent or share 
in its control.  
 Second, patenting will shift attention from the intrinsic motiva-
tion of obtaining a high score to the extrinsic motivation of obtaining 
commercially valuable intellectual property. Those who have con-
tributed significant ideas that are not patentable may have to sit by 
and watch as their contributions lead to commercially lucrative pa-
tentable inventions that benefit others. The rules around co-
authorship and the ability to be expansive in attributing co-
authorship at low cost make joint authorship a useful way of respect-
ing group contributions. The approach does not translate well into 
situations of joint inventorship, since contributions will typically take 
the form of tools that make discovery more likely rather than contri-
butions to the conception of the invention.79 Members may even have 
incentives to drop out of the game and seek patent protection for dis-
coveries that they would not have made but for access to the ideas 
contributed by other players.  
 
 78. As one high-scoring player of Foldit explained during an interview, “I shared BF 
[blue fuse tool] fully because Foldit is so much more than a game—the competition is seri-
ous and fierce, but we are also trying to improve the understanding of huge biological pro-
teins. We collaborate and compete at the same time.” Researchers Uncover Foldit Gamers’ 
Strategies, DRUG DISCOVERY & DEV. (Nov. 8, 2011, 11:16 AM), http://www.dddmag.com/ 
news/2011/11/researchers-uncover-foldit-gamers’-strategies. 
 79. In the scientific world, journal articles often include a variety of contributors, 
including those who have performed experiments or contributed hard work to generate the 
results. In contrast, joint inventorship is legally determined under patent law based on 
involvement by each inventor in the original conception of the invention. For further discussion 
of joint inventorship, see supra notes 75-76. 
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 Third, if and when Foldit moves into areas where it competes with 
commercial players, particularly if it partners with pharmaceutical 
companies or other private companies, there will be stronger pres-
sures on the administrators of the Foldit game to limit the public use 
of the discoveries generated. Where discoveries have identifiable 
commercial applications, the financial incentives to limit information 
sharing and to restrict use of the discoveries will be larger. In addi-
tion, if commercial partners play a bigger role in the game, the very 
different norms and rules governing commercial drug development 
will influence the ways in which the game is organized and the re-
sults are shared. 
 While these harms remain primarily prospective for now, the risks 
that market-based incentives may crowd out non-market mecha-
nisms of cooperation have been well documented in other similar ar-
eas and should not be ignored.80 Crowding out occurs when one ap-
proach to incentivizing participation has a negative impact on anoth-
er.81 It can occur in a variety of different ways, including internal 
displacement of intrinsic motivations and disruptions of the system 
through the actions and pressures of participants from outside of the 
system.82 In projects like Foldit, the social value of contributing to the 
project and the enjoyment derived from playing games in an open 
science context, as well as the commitment of Foldit administrators 
to open science, may eventually be overshadowed by financial incen-
 
 80. As described by Yochai Benkler, “[w]e have now . . . almost two decades of litera-
ture in experimental economics, game theory, anthropology, political science field studies, 
that shows that cooperation in fact does happen much more often than the standard eco-
nomics textbooks predict, and that under certain structural conditions non-price-based 
production is extraordinarily robust. The same literature also suggests that there is crowd-
ing-out, or displacement, between monetary and non-monetary motivations as well as be-
tween different institutional systems: [sic] social, as opposed to market, as opposed to 
state.” Yochai Benkler, Comment to Calacanis’s Wallet and the Web 2.0 Dream, ROUGH 
TYPE (July 28, 2006, 11:22 AM), http://www.roughtype.com/?p=466; see also Yochai 
Benkler, Coase’s Penguin, or, Linux and The Nature of the Firm, 112 YALE L.J. 369 (2002) 
[hereinafter Benkler, Coase’s Penguin].   
 81. “Crowding out, or the non-separability of social preferences from the introduction 
of explicit extrinsic motivation, poses a systemic challenge to using traditional, incentives-
based mechanisms, both private and public, for eliciting desirable behavior.” Benkler, 
supra note 1, at 307; see also Samuel Bowles, Policies Designed for Self-Interested Citizens 
May Undermine “The Moral Sentiments”: Evidence from Economic Experiments, 320 SCI. 
1605 (2008). One of the most widely debated examples of crowding out is the use of 
payments to encourage blood donations, which pits an economic framework for blood 
donations against a system of altruistic unpaid donors. See, e.g., RICHARD M. TITMUSS, THE 
GIFT RELATIONSHIP 158-59 (1971); Alena M. Buyx, Blood Donation, Payment, and Non-
Cash Incentives: Classical Questions Drawing Renewed Interest, 36 TRANSFUSION MED. & 
HEMOTHERAPY 329, 329-30 (2009) (exploring strategies for creating well-designed non-cash 
incentives which cut across the rigid dichotomy of altruistic donation versus payment). 
 82. See, e.g., OSTROM, supra note 25; SUCCESSFUL MANAGEMENT BY MOTIVATION: 
BALANCING INTRINSIC AND EXTRINSIC INCENTIVES (Bruno S. Frey & Margit Osterloh 
eds., 2002).  
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tives, such as patent royalties. The financial incentives might thus 
crowd out social motivations. This kind of displacement poses an un-
deniable risk for open source, volunteer-driven models of innovation 
like Foldit.83 Sustaining the kinds of non-market mechanisms that 
support Foldit, including the important mechanisms of trust, benefit-
sharing, and reciprocity, will undoubtedly become harder in the pres-
ence of patents.84 Ironically, the more successful the non-market 
mechanisms are in generating inventions, the more likely it is that 
they will come under challenge.  
 2.   Open Source Software: The Example of Linux  
 “No one ‘owns’ the software in the traditional sense . . . . The result 
has been the emergence of a vibrant, innovative and productive col-
laboration, whose participants are not organized in firms and do 
not choose their projects in response to price signals.”—Yochai 
Benkler 85  
 The second example is drawn from open source software.86 Open 
source software projects have proven to be a significant economic and 
social phenomenon, particularly in the context of software develop-
ment.87 Sourceforge, which is one of the main internet sites hosting 
open source software projects, lists more than 4.8 million daily down-
loads, more than 430,000 open source software projects involving 
more than 3.7 million developers.  Its directory connects more than 
41.8 million consumers with these open source projects.88 While most 
of these projects are small, some, such as the Linux operating sys-
tem, the Apache web server software, the MySQL database, and the 
Firefox web browser, are massive and compete with established pro-
prietary software products. The open source smartphone operating 
 
 83. For discussions of intrinsic versus extrinsic motivations and the crowding-out effects 
of carrot and stick approaches, see DANIEL H. PINK, DRIVE: THE SURPRISING TRUTH ABOUT 
WHAT MOTIVATES US 3-4, 8-9, 17-21 (2009). 
 84. As noted earlier, there are many reasons why people become involved in projects like 
Foldit, and the three mechanisms described here are meant simply to capture the ways in 
which these cooperative systems sustain the involvement of these diverse participants with 
their diverse motivations and interests.  
 85. Benkler, Coase’s Penguin, supra note 80.  
 86. Much has been written about the free and open source software movement. For a 
good overview from an intellectual property perspective, see Vetter, supra note 26. 
 87. See, e.g., Eric von Hippel & Georg von Krogh, Open Source Software and the “Pri-
vate-Collective” Innovation Model: Issues for Organization Science, 14 ORG. SCI. 209, 209 
(2003) (discussing history of open source software and its emergence as major cultural and 
economic phenomenon); see also ERIC S. RAYMOND, THE CATHEDRAL AND THE BAZAAR: 
MUSINGS ON LINUX AND OPEN SOURCE BY AN ACCIDENTAL REVOLUTIONARY (1999). 
 88. SOURCEFORGE, http://sourceforge.net/about (last visited Mar. 22, 2014). 
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system Android, for example, which is closely tied to Linux, was es-
timated to have seventy percent of the smartphone market in 2012.89  
 Open source software projects deviate from private proprietary 
models of software development in at least two important ways.90 
First, most truly open source software projects are fueled at least in 
part by software developers who are primarily intrinsically rather 
than extrinsically motivated to participate. People contribute to the 
project because they want to, whether to solve their own problems, 
contribute to a community that they have benefited from in the past, 
gain a reputation, or as an outlet for creativity.91 Second, participants 
freely reveal the software that they have developed in ways that al-
low other participants not only to use it, but also to modify and build 
upon it.92 These characteristics are combined with organizational in-
novations that allow people to contribute to the software project in a 
massively distributed, decentralized way, and with very low transac-
tion costs. These open source software systems show how valuable 
products can be developed in systems that are based upon the free 
contribution and sharing of ideas.93    
 While a few open source software systems, such as Linux and its 
stepchild Android, have been able to compete with proprietary prod-
ucts, the costs of doing so in the presence of an increasing number of 
software patents have been large. These costs include millions of dol-
lars spent by Linux and Android users in obtaining patents solely for 
defensive purposes, the development and refinement of defensive pa-
tent pooling and licensing organizations and strategies, time spent 
trying to invalidate patents that might impede use of Linux, and 
foreclosure of potentially valuable development paths for Linux 
 
 89. See, e.g., Nirav Patel, Apple’s iPhone Is Losing Market Share as Android Gets 
70% of the Smartphone Market, GADGET MASTERS (Jan. 28, 2013), http://www.thegadget 
masters.com/2013/01/28/apple-iphone-is-losing-market-share-as-android-gets-70-of-the-sma 
rtphone-market/. 
 90. For an overview of open source software and its implications and intersections 
with intellectual property, see, for example, Maurer & Scotchmer, supra note 15.  
 91. See, e.g., Jürgen Bitzer et al., Intrinsic Motivation in Open Source Software Devel-
opment, 35 J. COMP. ECON. 160, 162 (2007); Georg von Krogh et al., Carrots and Rainbows: 
Motivation and Social Practice in Open Source Software Development, 36 MIS Q. 649, 652 
(2012); Chorng-Guang Wu et al., An Empirical Analysis of Open Source Software Develop-
ers’ Motivations and Continuance Intentions, 44 INFO. & MGMT. 253, 254-55 (2007). But see, 
e.g., Sharon Belenzon & Mark Schankerman, Motivation and Sorting in Open Source Soft-
ware Innovation (Nov. 5, 2012) (unpublished manuscript), available at https://faculty. 
fuqua.duke.edu/~sb135/bio/Belenzon%20Schankerman%20OSS%20July%202012.pdf (ex-
amining observed pattern of contributions to open source software projects to extract re-
vealed preferences of developers and illustrating the importance of understanding incen-
tives heterogeneity in open source contributions). 
 92. See von Hippel & von Krogh, supra note 87 (describing open source software 
development systems, referring to them as illustrations of a private-collective model of 
innovation that occupies the middle ground between private investment and collective action).  
 93. Id.   
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where such paths fall outside of the protective boundaries established 
by large corporate users of open source.94 Moreover, other promising 
open source systems switch course or even shut down when confront-
ed with real or imagined patent threats.95 I focus on the story of 
Linux and the patent shadows created by Microsoft’s patents for two 
reasons. First, this story illustrates the susceptibility of even the 
most successful open source models to patent threats. Second, it 
demonstrates the difficulties that open source software supporters 
face in reducing patent threats.96  
 Linux was one of the pioneering free and open source software 
projects. It has its roots in the intertwined ideologies and develop-
ment models generated by early free software and open source soft-
ware movements, which are collectively referred to as Free and Open 
Source Software (FOSS).97 At a general level, FOSS is software which 
is made freely available, in both object and source code form, for any-
one to use, copy, modify, and distribute, thus enabling people to vol-
untarily improve the design of the software.98 On a closer look, how-
ever, FOSS refers both to an ideology about the freedom to use, modi-
fy, and share this resource, which lies at the core of the Free Soft-
ware Movement, and to a methodology for peer-to-peer development, 
which is the focus of the Open Source Movement.99  
 
 94. For a discussion of some of these costs, see, for example, Deborah Nicholson, Open 
Invention Network: A Defensive Patent Pool for Open Source Projects and Businesses, 2012 
TECH. INNOVATION MGMT. REV. 12. For a discussion of recent efforts by Microsoft to raise the 
costs for a number of Android manufacturers through threats of patent infringement suits and 
licensing deals with large royalties and very restrictive licensing terms, see, for example, 
Michele Boldrin & David K. Levine, The Case Against Patents (Fed. Reserve Bank of St. Louis, 
Working Paper No. 2012-035A, 2012), available at http://research.stlouisfed.org/wp/2012/2012-
035.pdf (discussing impact of patents in Android context); Tom Warren, Barnes & Noble 
“Exposes” Microsoft’s Android Patent Fees and Strategy, WINRUMORS (Nov. 14, 2011, 6:53 PM), 
http://www.winrumors.com/barnes-noble-exposes-microsofts-android-patent-fees-and-strategy/. 
 95. See, e.g., Nicholson, supra note 94, at 14 (discussing chilling effect of potential 
patent threats on small companies and smaller projects even when no actual patent is 
asserted); Wen Wen et al., Patent Commons, Thickets, and Open Source Software Entry by 
Start-Up Firms, (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Res., Working Paper No. 19394, 2013), available at 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w19394 (empirical study showing that rate of entry of start-up 
software firms increases with the size of open source software communities). 
 96. For an example of the power of open source software models as a substitute for 
traditional standard-setting approaches, see Greg R. Vetter, Open Source Licensing and 
Scattering Opportunism in Software Standards, 48 B.C. L. REV. 225 (2007).  
 97. See, e.g., Vetter, supra note 26; see also WOLFGANG LEISTER ET AL., OPEN SOURCE, 
OPEN COLLABORATION AND INNOVATION 15-26, 47-78 (Wolfgang Leister & Nils 
Christophersen eds., 2012).   
 98. See, e.g., The Open Source Definition, OPEN SOURCE INITIATIVE, 
http://opensource.org/osd (last visited Mar. 22, 2014); What Is Free Software and Why Is It 
So Important for Society?, FREE SOFTWARE FOUND., http://www.fsf.org/about/what-is-free-
software (last visited Mar. 22, 2014).  
 99. For a related discussion of the causal factors underlying FOSS, see Greg R. Vetter, 
Exit and Voice in Free and Open Source Software Licensing: Moderating the Rein over Software 
Users, 85 OR. L. REV. 183 (2006). For the Free Software Movement’s description of how they 
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 While these two camps share many features, they have different 
views about what FOSS requires—disparities that quickly become 
apparent in their responses to proprietary uses of software.100 The 
Free Software Movement believes that software should be free. To 
promote this goal and to protect the free use of software, it advocates 
that uses of and improvements to open source software should be 
made available on open source terms. Beliefs about freedom, fairness, 
and reciprocity lie at the center of the free software movement. The 
Open Source Software movement is less worried about proprietary 
software and proprietary use of FOSS, viewing open source more as a 
development methodology and less as a social movement.101 Both 
groups share a reliance on swift trust and reciprocity, however, and 
beliefs about the value of open source software help to sustain norms 
of open access and sharing that are critical to open source software.102 
The entanglement of ideology and development methodology is im-
portant in explaining both the strengths and the vulnerabilities of 
even large and successful open source projects like Linux.103 
 Linux was developed pursuant to a unique collaborative develop-
ment project,104 and it remains one of the largest systems of collabo-
rative development in the history of computing. As described by Eric 
Raymond in his seminal article The Cathedral and the Bazaar, “Who 
would have thought even five years ago (1991) that a world-class op-
erating system could coalesce as if by magic out of part-time hacking 
by several thousand developers scattered all over the planet, con-
nected only by the tenuous strands of the Internet?”105 It encapsu-
 
differ from the Open Source Movement, see Why “Free Software” Is Better Than Open Source, 
GNU OPERATING SYS., https://www.gnu.org/philosophy/free-software-for-freedom.html (last 
visited Mar. 22, 2014) (noting that the movements “disagree on the basic principles, but agree 
more or less on the practical recommendations”). 
 100. See, e.g., Richard Stallman, Free Software as a Social Movement, ZNET (Dec. 18, 2005), 
http://www.zcommunications.org/free-software-as-a-social-movement-by-richard-stallman. 
 101. See, e.g., Anne Barron, Free Software Production as Critical Social Practice, 42 
ECON. & SOC’Y 597 (2013) (describing the contrast between the ideological approach of the 
free software movement and the pragmatic approach of the subsequent open source  
software movement). 
 102. See, e.g., Osterloh & Rota, supra note 27; Osterloh, Rota & Kuster, supra note 31, 
at 2 (“The fragile balance between intrinsically and extrinsically motivated developers may 
be disturbed by the entrance of extrinsically motivated commercial firms into the world of 
open source.”).  
 103. See, e.g., Vetter, supra note 99 (exploring important aspects of this entanglement 
between ideology and methodology). 
 104. See, e.g., LINUX FOUNDATION, http://www.linuxfoundation.org (last visited Mar. 22, 
2014) (describing how Linux is built). 
 105. See Eric Steven Raymond, The Cathedral and the Bazaar, http://www.catb.org/~esr/ 
writings/cathedral-bazaar/cathedral-bazaar/index.html (last updated Aug. 2, 2002) 
(contrasting two forms of software development, the hierarchical cathedral approach used in 
proprietary software and the decentralized, open, Internet-based development style used  
by Linux). 
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lates the powerful idea of software as a modular and communal In-
ternet-based effort.106 The source code of Linux is made available 
without charge, and with the ability to freely modify and use this 
code, pursuant to version two of a well-known free and open source 
copyright license called the General Public License (GPL).107 The li-
censing model is a legal innovation, what has been referred to as le-
gal jujitsu, designed to use intellectual property rights to preserve 
the open source nature of the project.108 The GPL embodies principles 
of open access, free sharing, and reciprocity in its license restrictions 
and contractual obligations as a way of preserving and expanding the 
domain of open source software. While open source licensing strategies 
such as this one have helped to sustain open source efforts, the need for 
additional strategies to preserve open source has been widely acknowl-
edged by proponents of open source.109 In the case of Linux, backing by 
large corporate players was an essential part of its survival. 
 Linux rapidly gained popularity as an alternative to Microsoft’s 
proprietary software operating system. In response, Microsoft began 
a concerted strategy to disadvantage Linux by encouraging compa-
nies to trade open source participation for financial gain and by get-
ting the users of Linux to pay royalties to Microsoft. This included a 
controversial joint patent agreement between Microsoft and a com-
pany called Novell, Inc., a software company that had initially set 
itself up to compete with Microsoft using Linux-based open source 
 
 106. See, e.g., LEISTER ET AL., supra note 97, at 47-78. 
 107. The GPL provides that software licensed under the GPL can be freely used, copied 
and modified, provided that any modifications and improvements to this software are also 
made available to the public in source code form under the same license terms. The first 
two versions of the GPL focused primarily on copyright, but a third version has been 
developed to address the significant challenges that software patents create for the open 
source process. See GNU General Public License, Version 2, GNU OPERATING SYS. (June, 
1991), http://www.gnu.org/licenses/gpl-2.0.html; GNU General Public License, Version 3, 
GNU OPERATING SYS. (June 29, 2007), http://www.gnu.org/licenses/gpl.html; see also 
Robert W. Gomulkiewicz, A First Look at General Public License 3.0, 24 COMPUTER & 
INTERNET L. 15, 15 (2007). For critiques of GPL version 3 see, for example, James E.J. 
Bottomley et al., Kernel Developers’ Position on GPLv3: The Dangers and Problems with 
GPLv3, LWN.NET (Sept. 15, 2006), http://lwn.net/Articles/200422/; John Carroll, The Crux 
of the GPL Problem, ZDNET (June 4, 2007, 7:42 AM), http://www.zdnet.com/blog/ 
carroll/the-crux-of-the-gpl-problem/1707. 
 108. The GNU/Linux computer operating system includes the Linux kernel, an open 
source project initiated by Linus Torvalds in 1991, and GNU software emerging from the free 
software movement founded by Richard Stallman in 1985. Richard Stallman, Linux and the 
GNU System, GNU OPERATING SYS., http://www.gnu.org/gnu/linux-and-gnu.html (last updated 
Apr. 12, 2014). I focus here on the development of the Linux kernel, although the issues extend 
to the broader GNU/Linux operating system. 
 109. See, e.g., Clark D. Asay, A Case for the Public Domain, 74 OHIO ST. L.J. 753 
(2013); Jason Schultz & Jennifer M. Urban, Protecting Open Innovation: The Defensive 
Patent License as a New Approach to Patent Threats, Transaction Costs, and Tactical Dis-
armament, 26 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1 (2012); Greg R. Vetter, A Public Domain Approach to 
Free and Open Source Software?, 75 OHIO ST. L.J. FURTHERMORE (forthcoming 2014).  
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software products.110 Novell received large payments pursuant to its 
deal with Microsoft, and when the deal ended, a technology consorti-
um led by Microsoft acquired key intellectual property assets from 
Novell for $450 million.111 Members of the FOSS community criticized 
Novell for what they saw as a defection from group norms and a com-
promise of the interests of the free software community. Novell was 
seen as free-riding on the value created by the open source communi-
ty and capitalizing on the holdup value of patents covering inventions 
used by the open source community. More importantly, the deal was 
seen as providing unwarranted legitimacy for patent claims made 
against Linux, creating a cloud of uncertainty and fear for users of 
Linux and deterring open source developers.112 
 Shortly after the first agreement with Novell was signed, Mi-
crosoft began making public claims that Linux violated more than 
200 of Microsoft’s patents—no fewer than 235 according to Mi-
crosoft’s general counsel at that time.113 The fact that the Linux 
source code is freely available allows patent holders to scrutinize the 
code for areas that might implicate their patents. The fact that the 
system involves combining and building on incremental contributions 
means that patents covering even small parts of the system may 
have tremendous holdup power. Since its initial claims of infringe-
ment, Microsoft has focused on systematically securing patent licens-
ing deals from Linux users, although it has also relied on patent in-
fringement litigation against select users of Linux.114 Patent asser-
tion entities such as IP Innovations, a subsidiary of Acacia Technolo-
gies, have also brought patent suits against prominent users of Linux 
such as Red Hat. Some speculate that Microsoft backed the Acacia 
litigation against Red Hat.115 Red Hat, which provides services based 
 
 110. See, e.g., Elizabeth Montalbano, Update: Microsoft, Novell Strike Linux Deal, 
COMPUTERWORLD (Nov. 2, 2006, 12:00 PM), http://www.computerworld.com/s/article/ 
9004723/Update_Microsoft_Novell_strike_Linux_deal; Paul Krill, The Microsoft-Novell Linux 
Deal: Two Years Later, INFOWORLD (Nov. 18, 2008), http://www.infoworld.com/d/open-
source/microsoft-novell-linux-deal-two-years-later-858. 
 111. See sources cited supra note 104.  
 112. See, e.g., Katherine Noyes, Microsoft’s Hand in Novell Deal Bodes Ill for Linux, 
PCWORLD (Nov. 22, 2010, 3:12 PM), http://www.pcworld.com/article/211414/microsofts_ 
hand_in_novell_deal_bodes_ill_for_linux.html; TECHRIGHTS, http://www.techrights.org/home/ 
(last visited Mar. 22, 2014) (showing Roy Schestowitz is editor of the site). 
 113. See, e.g., Mary Jo Foley, Microsoft: Free and Open Source Software Violates 235 
Microsoft Patents, ZDNET (May 13, 2007, 4:46 PM), http://www.zdnet.com/blog/microsoft/ 
microsoft-free-and-open-source-software-violates-235-microsoft-patents/436; Peter Lattman, 
Patent Litigation’s Battle Royale: Microsoft v. Open Source, WALL ST. J., LAW BLOG (May 
15, 2007. 9:21 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2007/05/15/patent-litigations-battle-royale-
microsoft-v-open-source/. 
 114. See, e.g., John C. Dvorak, Microsoft’s Nuisance Suit Strategy, PC MAG. (Sept. 21, 
2011), http://www.pcmag.com/article2/0,2817,2393361,00.asp. 
 115. See, e.g., J. Nicholas Hoover, Acacia Research, Linux Patent Adversary, Has Long 
Litigation History, INFORMATIONWEEK (Oct. 12, 2007, 4:32 PM), http://www.information 
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on Linux, is often heralded as one of the open source software com-
pany success stories, making it a natural target for opponents of 
Linux. The company complains of having to routinely address “at-
tempts to impede the innovative forces of open source via allegations 
of patent infringement.”116 General and widespread threats like those 
made by Microsoft increase the real and perceived risks and the 
transaction costs of contributing to and using open source software 
for all participants in the open source system, with the largest impact 
on developers and users who are not affiliated with and protected by 
large companies. Even small changes in cost and risk may deter 
many users of the resulting software, chill development efforts, and 
alter otherwise promising development paths. 
 The availability of software patents increased the commercial at-
tractiveness of defecting from the FOSS community for Novell and 
increased the risks of third party patent infringement suits against 
community members.117 These risks ultimately forced community 
members to rely heavily on the resources of large commercial partici-
pants such as IBM to protect Linux through defensive patenting 
strategies. Linux survived despite patent risks and costs largely by 
becoming an established part of the business model of major partici-
pants in the software industry.118 By some estimates more than half 
of the companies in the Fortune 500 are using Linux in their data 
centers.119 These large corporate users have invested significant re-
sources both in the development and the protection of the Linux pro-
ject.120 In response to patent infringement threats made by Microsoft 
against Linux, large corporate users of Linux—i.e. IBM, NEC, Novell, 
Phillips, Red Hat, and Sony—set up the Open Invention Network 
 
week.com/acacia-research-linux-patent-adversary-has-long-litigation-history/d/d-id/106 0255?; 
Roy Schestowitz, Red Hat Pays Microsoft-Linked Patent Troll Again, Refuses to Provide 
Details, TECHRIGHTS (May 25, 2013, 7:16 AM), http://techrights.org/2013/05/25/acacia-red-hat/. 
 116. See, e.g., Soulskill, Red Hat Settles Patent Case, SLASHDOT (Oct. 4, 2010, 6:45 PM), 
http://linux.slashdot.org/story/10/10/04/2148218/red-hat-settles-patent-case?sdsrc=rel.  
 117. See, e.g., Krill, supra note 110. 
 118. See, e.g., Oliver Alexy & Markus Reitzig, Private-Collective Innovation, Competition, 
and Firms’ Counterintuitive Appropriation Strategies, 42 RES. POL’Y 895 (2013) (examining 
role of exclusion rights for technology in competition between private-collective and other 
innovators); Joel West, How Open Is Open Enough? Melding Proprietary and Open Source 
Platform Strategies, 32 RES. POL’Y 1259 (2003) (examining hybrid strategies and contrasting 
them with purely open and purely proprietary software alternatives).   
 119. Parloff, supra note 11. 
 120. See, e.g., Dan Woods, Can Intel Heal the Hadoop Open Source Ecosystem?, FORBES 
(Feb. 26, 2013, 9:22 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/danwoods/2013/02/26/can-intel-heal-the-
hadoop-open-source-ecosystem/2/ (“In the Linux community the primary contributors are those 
who benefit from using Linux in their businesses. IBM, Intel, Google, HP, Oracle all make a 
pile of money because Linux solves a variety of problems for them. The amount of value that 
they receive from this use dwarfs that captured by Red Hat or Suse, the Linux distributors. 
Linux thrives because the big players take part of the massive revenue from the use value and 
invest heavily in large development teams.”). 
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(OIN) in 2005 to acquire a portfolio of patents that could create prob-
lems for companies like Microsoft should they create problems for 
Linux users.121 OIN is self-described as “an intellectual property com-
pany that was formed to promote the Linux system by using patents to 
create a collaborative ecosystem.”122 “Patents owned by OIN are avail-
able royalty-free to any [entity] or individual that agrees not to assert 
its patents against [the] Linux” system.123 In addition, Open Source 
Development Labs, which is the consortium that promotes and coordi-
nates Linux development, established its own patent commons to ac-
cept donations of rights to use patents.124 The Patent Commons Project 
is self-described as creating an area of safety, “a preserve where devel-
opers and users of software can innovate, collaborate, and access pa-
tent resources in an environment of enhanced safety, protected by 
pledges of support made by holders of software patents.”125  
 These patent pooling efforts can be seen as a way of trying to pre-
serve the trust and reciprocity on which open source systems depend. 
Compliance with group norms is achieved by providing a patent 
shield for members who adhere to group norms. Reciprocity is en-
forced through contingent protections that are available only to par-
ticipants who do not themselves assert their patents against other 
group members or protected open source projects. Other community 
responses to the patent threats have included Linux Defenders, an 
online clearinghouse for prior art designed to invalidate poor-quality 
software patents,126 and a project called A Patent a Day, with its goal 
of identifying one Microsoft-owned patent every day that Linux po-
tentially infringes with the goal of helping to get rid of the dependen-
cy on these patents and/or get rid of the patents.127 These efforts il-
lustrate the ways in which open source communities must participate 
in the patent system simply as a way of protecting their non-
proprietary software systems from extinction. 
 Such efforts come with a very steep price tag both in terms of cost 
and in terms of increasingly centralized control over open source. 
Monitoring and acquiring patents are ironic ways for an open source 
 
 121. Nicholson, supra note 94, at 16; see also OPEN INVENTION NETWORK, 
http://www.openinventionnetwork.com (last visited Mar. 22, 2014). 
 122. Nicholson, supra note 94, at 16. 
 123. OPEN INVENTION NETWORK, supra note 121. 
 124. See, e.g., Steve Hamm, Linux Marches On, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Nov. 16, 
2005), http://www.businessweek.com/the_thread/techbeat/archives/2005/11/linux_marches_ 
o.html; see also PATENT COMMONS, http://www.patentcommons.org (last visited Mar. 22, 2014). 
 125. PATENT COMMONS, supra note 124. 
 126. LINUX DEFENDERS, http://linuxdefenders.org (last visited Mar. 22, 2014). 
 127. See PatentSleuth, Introduction Post: A Patent a Day Project, LINUX PATENTS (July 
4, 2009, 8:26 AM), http://linuxpatents.blogspot.com/2009/07/introduction-post-patent-day-
project.html.  
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community to spend its funds. Reliance on defensive patenting and 
pooling strategies also changes the balance of power within the open 
source community, giving corporate participants with large patent 
holdings control over the directions that open source projects take. 
One of the largest corporate supporters of Linux, IBM, also regularly 
tops the list of patents filed at the U.S. Patent and Trademark Of-
fice.128 Corporate patent holders like IBM have significant power in 
shaping the boundaries of protected open source software spaces, 
aligning the boundaries with their own private business interests 
and strategies. In addition to favoring some open source software pro-
jects but not others, commercial partners of the open source communi-
ty tend to favor hybrid models in which proprietary and open source 
software development coexists.129 While not everybody sees this shift 
towards hybrid models as a problem,130 many members of the open 
source software community are skeptical that a balance of closed and 
open source software will survive.131 Their concerns include the nega-
tive impact of hybrid models on the motivations supporting open 
source software communities, the shift in control over development 
paths for software that impacts private business interests, the high 
direct and indirect costs of defensive patents strategies that pervade 
this hybrid world, and the threats that patents will continue to pose 
for open source models not backed by large corporate users.132  
 Thus, while private orderings of intellectual property rights such 
as defensive patent pooling may serve to mitigate patent threats for 
open source software, they do so in a limited and costly way. Patents 
continue to challenge the viability of FOSS systems that rely on 
 
 128. See, e.g., IBM Earns Most U.S. Patents for 17th Consecutive Year; Will Offer 
Licenses to Patent Portfolio Management Know-How, IBM (Jan. 12, 2010), http://www-
03.ibm.com/press/us/en/pressrelease/29168.wss.  
 129. See, e.g., Open-Source Software: Going Hybrid, ECONOMIST, (July 25, 2002), available 
at http://www.economist.com/node/1251254; Rosa Maria Ballardini, Proprietary Software vs. 
FOSS: Challenges with Hybrid Protection Models (May 2012) (Ph.D. dissertation, IPR Univ. 
Ctr.), available at http://www.iprinfo.com/julkaisut/verkkojulkaisut/ipr-series-b/en_GB/ 
proprietary-software-vs-foss/_files/88742337887406149/default/B4_Ballardini_eng.pdf. 
 130. See, e.g., Dreyfuss, supra note 9; Ronald J. Mann, Commercializing Open Source 
Software: Do Property Rights Still Matter?, 20 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 3 (2006) (exploring the 
symbiotic relationship between proprietary and open source software); Jay P. Kesan, The 
Fallacy of OSS Discrimination by FRAND Licensing: An Empirical Analysis (Univ. of Ill. 
Coll. of Law Pub. Law & Legal Theory Res. Paper Series, Paper No. 10-14, 2011), available 
at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1767083 (examining compatibility of 
OSS licenses with proprietary uses). 
 131.  See, e.g., Sonali K. Shah, Motivation, Governance, and the Viability of Hybrid 
Forms in Open Source Software Development, 52 MGMT. SCI. 1000 (2006). For a discussion 
of hybrid models and the issues that may arise, see, for example, Vetter, supra note 26.  
 132. See, e.g., Arnold Polanski, Is the General Public License a Rational Choice?, 55 J. 
INDUS. ECON. 691 (2007) (showing that proprietary licensing can lead to a holdup problem 
which may terminate a sequence of innovation prematurely, and that free open source 
licensing may be able to avoid this). 
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keeping costs and risks low and adherence to community norms 
based on openness, trust, and reciprocity high.133 I suggest that in the 
absence of larger patent reforms addressing concerns with software 
patents,134 systematic efforts by courts to take into account the costs 
of patents in cooperative contexts may help to limit these costs and to 
support a greater diversity of open source software projects.  
III.   PATENT ROADBLOCKS 
 As cooperative systems such as crowd science and free and open 
source software develop, they must confront patent laws that are de-
signed with a very different model of cooperation in mind. In some cas-
es the incentives that patents create may interfere with the mecha-
nisms of trust, benefit-sharing, and reciprocity on which these and 
other cooperative innovation systems rely, increasing collective action 
problems. In other cases, patent laws may help to solve collective ac-
tion problems. Fashioning the right policy response requires closer 
scrutiny of the relationship between patent laws and intellectual pro-
duction when private incentives and public interests diverge.135  
 Patents may impede the collective action needed to sustain coop-
erative innovation in two different ways. First, patents increase the 
incentives for individual members of a cooperative system to defect 
from group norms of open access and sharing. Where a member of a 
group has the opportunity to patent and privately exploit an inven-
tion that is useful to the group, this member will be less willing to 
share her ideas with the group and may be more likely to free ride on 
 
 133. For studies of the survival factors of open source software, see, for example, Kevin 
Crowston et al., Free/Libre Open-Source Software Development: What We Know and What 
We Do Not Know, 44 ACM COMPUTING SURV. 7:1 (2012); Vishal Midha & Prashant Palvia, 
Factors Affecting the Success of Open Source Software, 85 J. SYS. & SOFTWARE 895 (2012); 
Jing Wang, Survival Factors for Free Open Source Software Projects: A Multi-Stage Per-
spective, 30 EUR. MGMT. J. 352 (2012). 
 134. There is a rich literature identifying and responding to problems with software 
patents. See, e.g., Kevin Emerson Collins, Patent Law’s Functionality Malfunction and  
the Problem of Overbroad, Functional Software Patents, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 1399 (2013); 
Mark A. Lemley, Software Patents and the Return of Functional Claiming, 2013 WIS. L.  
REV. 905 (2013); James Bessen, A Generation of Software Patents, (Bos. Univ. Sch. of Law, 
Working Paper No. 11-31, 2011) (critically examining software patenting practices and impact 
on social welfare). 
 135. For use of game-theoretic models to explore opportunities for using patents to 
improve cooperative outcomes, see, for example, Shubha Ghosh, Patent Law and the Assurance 
Game: Refitting Intellectual Property in the Box of Regulation, 18 CAN. J.L. & JURISPRUDENCE 
307 (2005) (referencing the assurance game as an alternative way of thinking about the role of 
patent law in regulating innovation). Under the assurance game, more commonly known as 
the stag hunt, two hunters can jointly hunt a stag for high payoffs or individually hunt rabbits 
for smaller payoffs. If either hunts a stag alone, the chance of success is minimal. Hunting 
stags is most beneficial for the group but requires significant trust among its members. See 
also Ted Sichelman, Quantum Game Theory and Coordination in Intellectual Property (San 
Diego Legal Studs., Paper No. 10-035, 2010). 
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and exploit the ideas generated by the group. Additionally, a member 
may be driven against her interest to seek patent protection for protec-
tive reasons, fearing that others will appropriate the benefits from her 
contribution without sharing in return. Patents thus increase the indi-
vidual payoffs from defecting from group norms and may reduce the 
payoffs from adhering to group norms. As a result, members of the 
group will have reduced expectations that other members will behave 
in accordance with group norms of open and free sharing, further 
weakening these norms. Members of the group might also place less 
value on non-market rewards within the group such as reputation.  
 Second, patents increase the risks to group members posed by 
third parties. The open and transparent nature of intellectual pro-
duction in contexts of cooperative innovation makes it easy for third 
parties to assert patents against the group, and where third parties 
have patents covering technologies that are widely used by the group 
the third parties will have the ability to hold up the group and collect 
more than the incremental value of their technological contribution. 
Third parties may also be able to free ride on the intellectual produc-
tion of the group without any reciprocating contributions. Even gen-
eralized threats of third party litigation increase transaction costs for 
developers and users of open source software by forcing them into 
defensive patent licensing and pooling arrangements which need to 
be maintained and enforced. This requires them to spend time exam-
ining potential patent risks and planning for potential patent in-
fringement claims, and in some cases induces them to enter licenses 
and make royalty payments simply as a way of averting threats from 
aggressive patent holders.136 Cooperative systems are particularly 
sensitive to these kinds of transaction costs, since they rely on large 
numbers of volunteers freely sharing ideas. Even small changes in 
the cost of participation—such as the need to reserve funds to re-
spond to cease-and-desist letters from third parties, the learning 
costs associated with participating in defensive patent pools, the ad-
ministrative costs associated with making and using software cov-
ered by a growing family of different open source software license 
agreements, and small changes in the risk of participation—may 
therefore interfere with the continuing operations of the group. In 
some cases, these groups survive only by aligning the activities of the 
group with the private interests of one or a few large players with 
deep pockets and vested interests in the innovation system. By in-
creasing defections from group norms, and by increasing threats from 
 
 136. See, e.g., Schultz & Urban, supra note 109 (surveying options and some of the costs 
involved with these options); see also Nicholson, supra note 94, at 14 (discussing some of the 
transaction costs and chilling effects of patents for open source software participants).  
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outside the groups, patents may sometimes threaten or distort valu-
able processes of cooperative innovation.    
 The disconnect between the needs of cooperative innovation and 
the incentives that patents create can be explained in part by patent 
law’s attachment to an outdated model of innovation. The U.S. patent 
statute, as well as the broader international patent law framework 
now in place, is anchored on a paradigm of market-based, producer-
driven innovation.137 As a result, the patent statute and implement-
ing laws and regulations deal primarily with the creation, definition, 
and enforcement of ownership rights over inventions and the admin-
istration of this process.138 The right of the patent owner to exclude 
others from use of the invention forms the backbone of patent law, 
and most of the statute is devoted to defining and policing these 
rights. Patent remedies are designed to restore the patent owner to 
the status quo before infringement through the award of reasonable 
royalties, lost profits resulting from lost sales or price erosion,139 
and/or injunctive relief.140 The statute pays much less attention to the 
source and nature of the inputs leading to invention,141 and to how 
the subsequent patents are managed and used,142 or, even more im-
portantly, not used.143 
 Patent law does address issues of team production, but it does so 
largely with a focus on identifying the true inventors and protecting 
their collective rights through rules governing derivation and joint 
 
 137. See, e.g., Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Commodifying Collaborative Research, in THE 
COMMODIFICATION OF INFORMATION 397 (Niva Elkin-Koren & Neil Weinstock Netanel eds., 
2002) (examining myth of the individual inventor and disjuncture between current IP law and 
issues of importance to collaborators).  
 138. See 35 U.S.C. (2012). Part I of the statute deals with the establishment and operation 
of the USPTO, and Part II focuses primarily on how to obtain a patent, including requirements 
for patentability. Part III focuses on protection of patent rights. Part IV deals with the Patent 
Cooperation Treaty, addressing international issues relevant to the Act.  
 139. Compensation to the patent owner extends even to harm from offers to sell. See, e.g., 
Timothy R. Holbrook, Liability for the “Threat of a Sale”: Assessing Patent Infringement for 
Offering To Sell an Invention and Implications for the On-Sale Patentability Bar and Other 
Forms of Infringement, 43 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 751, 756-64 (2003). 
 140. For a description and critique of this private law focus of patent remedies, see 
Sichelman, supra note 19.  
 141. See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, Point of Novelty, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 1253 (2011); Lemley, 
supra note 9; Sean B. Seymore, Rethinking Novelty in Patent Law, 60 DUKE L. J. 919, 929 
(2011) (exploring complexity of ensuring that a patent does not issue if the public already 
possesses the invention, and joining “a larger project to bridge the disconnect between patent 
law and the norms of science”). 
 142. See, e.g., Herbert Hovenkamp, Innovation and the Domain of Competition Policy, 60 
ALA. L. REV. 103 (2008) (discussing rules dealing with patent management confined to defining 
what constitutes infringement, remedies, and patent misuse). 
 143. See, e.g., Oskar Liivak & Eduardo M. Peñalver, The Right Not to Use in Property and 
Patent Law (Cornell Law Sch. Legal Studs. Res. Paper Series, Research Paper No. 12-62, 
2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2162667.  
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inventorship. Doctrines of derivation144 and the shared ownership 
rules for co-inventors145 protect the rights of those team members who 
have either made an invention that is misappropriated or made in-
ventorship contributions to a collective invention. Pursuing deriva-
tion or joint inventorship claims is costly, however, and involves evi-
dentiary burdens that may be difficult to satisfy in contexts of mas-
sively distributed innovation. In addition, these doctrines do little to 
recognize or protect many kinds of valuable contributions to the col-
lective process of intellectual production. To be a joint inventor, an 
individual must contribute to the conception of the invention. This 
leaves out individuals who make contributions that increase the like-
lihood of discovery but do not contemplate the discovery and individ-
uals who work hard to reduce the invention to practice. Derivation 
proceedings address only situations in which it can be shown that 
members of the group actually made an invention that the patent 
applicant took without authorization.146 Again, this leaves out many 
situations in which the group performs the hard work needed to 
make discovery more likely through contributions such as research 
tools and ideas about paths not to take, as well as situations in which 
the group contributes to the reduction of the invention to practice. 
Moreover, both doctrines will be of limited practical relevance for 
many cooperative innovation projects that have limited budgets and 
 
 144.  Derivation refers to situations in which an alleged inventor has derived the claimed 
invention from another. See 35 U.S.C. § 135 (2012). Derivation proceedings are costly and 
evidence intensive, requiring the challenging inventor(s) to file their own patent application, 
file a derivation petition within one year of the first publication of the claimed invention, show 
that the invention is “the same or substantially the same” as the earlier claim to the invention, 
provided a detailed explanation for claiming unauthorized derivation, and provide substantial 
evidence to support the petition. See, e.g., Derivation Proceeding: Overview, AM. INVENTS ACT, 
http://www.aiarulemaking.com/rulemaking-topics/group-3/derivation-proceedings.php (last 
visited Mar. 22, 2014). For concerns about the limits of derivation proceedings, see, for 
example, N. Scott Pierce, The Effects of the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act on Collaborative 
Research, 94 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 133 (2012); Joshua D. Sarnoff, Derivation and 
Prior Art Problems with the New Patent Act, 2011 PATENTLY-O PAT. L.J. 12; Dennis Crouch, 
With 102(f) Eliminated, Is Inventorship Now Codified in 35 U.S.C. 101? Maybe, but not 
Restrictions on Patenting Obvious Variants of Derived Information, PATENTLY-O (Oct. 4, 2012), 
http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2012/10/with-102f-eliminated-is-inventorship-now-codified-
in-35-usc-101.html. 
 145. Where an invention is made by two or more persons jointly, they are considered joint 
inventors even if they did not work together or make the same kinds or amount of contribution. 
35 U.S.C. § 116 (2006). Unless otherwise agreed by contract, they are joint owners of the 
resulting patent and are free to use and authorize others to use the invention without the 
consent of or accounting to the other owners and all must join in an infringement suit based on 
the patent. 35 U.S.C. § 262 (2006).   
 146. See supra note 138; see also Gene Quinn, First Inventor to File: USPTO Derivation 
Proceedings Go Final, IPWATCHDOG (Sept. 10, 2012, 11:26 AM), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/ 
2012/09/10/first-inventor-to-file-uspto-derivation-proceedings-go-final/id=27986/ (describing 
derivation proceedings).  
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a decentralized, volunteer-based project design that is poorly suited 
to the pursuit of legal measures.147  
 In addition to the doctrines relevant to team production discussed 
above, patent law has been amended in response to the special needs 
of collaborations among different entities, but once again its response 
has been largely confined to ensuring that inventions can be patented 
by at least one of the collaborators. When different entities collabo-
rate to innovate, patent law has been adjusted to limit the barriers 
that sharing information may pose for patenting inventions that 
emerge from the collaboration.148   
 With respect to how subsequent patents are managed and used, or 
not used, the focus in patent law remains on the patent owner’s 
rights to exclude others from using the patented invention. Little ef-
fort has been made to distinguish between socially beneficial and det-
rimental kinds of unauthorized patent use.149 Defenses to infringe-
ment based on special circumstances of creation and use, such as in-
dependent discovery or experimental use, remain narrow even after 
changes introduced to patent law by the America Invents Act (AIA) 
to expand protections for prior inventors.150 Third parties are general-
ly not free to use the patented invention for any purposes, not even 
for experimentation or to confirm that the invention actually works 
as disclosed in the patent. Concepts of protecting certain kinds of 
publicly beneficial uses, such as the fair use found in copyright law, 
are missing altogether from the patent statute.151  
 
 147. See Aaron X. Fellmeth, Conception and Misconception in Joint Inventorship, 2 N.Y.U. 
J. INTELL. PROP. & ENT. L. 73 (2012) (discussing problems with claim fixation in inventorship 
and consequences for collaborative research).  
 148. See Cooperative Research and Technology Enhancement (CREATE) Act of 2004, Pub. 
L. No. 108-453, 118 Stat. 3596 (amending Section 103 of the Patent Act). For a discussion of 
the CREATE Act, including some potential concerns that it may pose for participants in 
collaborations, see Liza S. Vertinsky, Understanding and Applying the CREATE Act in 
Collaborations, in 3 AUTM TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER PRACTICE MANUAL (3d ed. 2008); see also 
Pierce, supra note 144.  
 149. This may be changing, albeit in a limited way, as courts and perhaps even Congress 
respond to the challenges that patents covering standards essential to critical technologies 
have created. See Part IV.A.  
 150. See, e.g., Lemley, supra note 9 (examining the disconnect between traditional theories 
of patent law and real-world experience, particularly in the context of independent invention). 
The AIA expands the protection for prior inventors. It provides a “prior use defense” to patent 
infringement that protects parties who can establish that they have in good faith commercially 
used a product or process covered by a patent at least one year before the earlier of the public 
disclosure or the effective filling date of the patent disclosing the invention. Although more 
robust than the one it replaced, it includes a number of limitations. See U.S. PAT. & 
TRADEMARK OFF., REPORT ON THE PRIOR USER RIGHTS DEFENSE (2012), available at 
http://www.uspto.gov/aia_implementation/20120113-pur_report.pdf.   
 151. See, e.g., Maureen A. O’Rourke, Toward a Doctrine of Fair Use in Patent Law, 100 
COLUM. L. REV. 1177 (2000) (arguing that new technology has put pressure on patent laws that 
increasingly interfere with follow on innovation, and proposes a doctrine of fair use in patent 
law to relieve some of this pressure); Katherine J. Strandburg, Patent Fair Use 2.0, 1 U.C. 
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 Members of a community that contribute valuable ideas to the in-
ventor are simply out of luck unless they have the resources and the 
ability to show that they are joint inventors, that their invention was 
derived from them, or that the patented invention would be obvious 
to individual community members in light of the combined 
knowledge and effort of the community.152 Determining who contrib-
uted what to an invention in a collaborative effort is difficult, particu-
larly where innovation takes the form of cumulative, incremental 
contributions by many participants.153 Showing that an invention was 
derived from the cumulative, widely-shared discoveries of the group 
is likely to be both costly and challenging. The limits that non-
obviousness imposes on patentability are also unlikely to provide ad-
equate protection for collective intellectual production.154 Even if a 
group can find and present prior art challenging the novelty of a pa-
tent, they must overcome the legal presumption that the patent is 
valid. This presumption holds regardless of whether the U.S. Patent 
and Trademark Office considered the prior art when granting the 
patent.155 Patent law, both on the books and as applied, remains too 
heavily oriented around the patent ownership rights of the pioneer-
ing lone inventors and their assignees. In doing so, patent law ne-
glects the needs of other very different forms of intellectual produc-
tion such as cooperative innovation.156  
 This is not to suggest that patents are always or even mostly a 
constraint on innovation or that innovation would increase in the ab-
 
IRVINE L. REV. 265 (2011) (arguing that there should be greater use of defenses and 
exemptions to patent infringement to respond to the different contexts in which inventions are 
used); see also Lorelei Ritchie de Larena, What Copyright Teaches Patent Law About “Fair Use” 
and Why Universities Are Ignoring the Lesson, 84 OR. L. REV. 779 (2005) (arguing that a 
doctrine of fair use will help reduce negative externalities and clarify expectations on what 
type of infringement is actionable).  
 152. See 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2012) (addressing conditions for patentability and non-
obvious subject matter); supra note 75 (discussing joint inventorship); supra note 144 
(discussing derivation). 
 153. See also Dennis Crouch, Inventorship: Limits of Collaboration, PATENTLY-O (Apr. 
1, 2013), http://patentlyo.com/patent/2013/04/inventorship-limits-of-collaboration.html (dis-
cussing outcome of Rubin v. Gen. Hosp. Corp., 523 F. App’x 719 (Fed. Cir. 2013)).  
 154. See, e.g., Shawn P. Miller, Where’s the Innovation: An Analysis of the Quantity and 
Qualities of Anticipated and Obvious Patents, 18 VA. J.L. & TECH. 1 (2012) (suggesting patents 
are being awarded with negligible innovation value); see also Gregory Mandel, The Non-
Obvious Problem: How the Indeterminate Nonobviousness Standard Produces Excessive Patent 
Grants, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 57 (2008). 
 155. See, e.g., Sciele Pharma Inc. v. Lupin Ltd., 684 F.3d 1253, 1260 (Fed. Cir. 2012).  
 156. While the requirement to disclose the invention could be seen as facilitating 
sharing, it is at best a limited form of sharing. See Timothy R. Holbrook, Possession in 
Patent Law, 59 SMU L. REV. 123, 132-34 (pointing out the disconnect between role of 
disclosure as teaching and theory of combating free-riding, suggests that we think of the 
function of disclosure as possession).  
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sence of patents.157 Patents play important roles in attracting re-
sources and providing market incentives for proprietary, producer-
driven innovation.158 Patents can also enable limited departures from 
closed, producer-driven systems of innovation by supporting open in-
novation models in which companies sell or license out unused tech-
nologies and acquire or license in third party discoveries.159 Where 
patents interfere with cooperation that patent owners are interested 
in preserving, the patent owners can create their own contract-based 
forms of sharing and pooling patent rights. Patent pools,160 licensing 
strategies that incorporate broader public objectives and public uses 
into the license terms,161 and patent licensing strategies modeled on 
those employed by open source software,162 can and do operate to pre-
serve areas of cooperation.163 Moreover, existing rules and doctrines 
such as joint inventorship and the limiting effects of prior art and 
derivation on patentability in contexts of cumulative intellectual pro-
duction mitigate some of the incentive problems that patents might 
otherwise create for cooperative innovation.   
 While these legal tools and private arrangements are helpful in 
making room for cooperative innovation, they do not adequately ad-
dress the harmful incentive effects of patents on non-market mecha-
 
 157. See, e.g., Jonathan M. Barnett, Intellectual Property as a Law of Organization,  
84 S. CAL. L. REV. 785 (2011) [hereinafter Barnett, Law of Organization] (discussing  
the role of patents in supporting disaggregation of innovation process); Barnett, The 
Illusion of the Commons, supra note 20 (examining the importance of property in 
supporting sharing regimes).  
 158. Strong patent rights may facilitate coordination among many different market 
players by reducing transaction costs, solving problems of incomplete contracting, signaling 
firm value, or facilitating bargains over use of the patent rights. See, e.g., Ashish Arora & 
Robert P. Merges, Specialized Supply Firms, Property Rights and Firm Boundaries, 13 
INDUS. & CORP. CHANGE 451 (2004); Barnett, Law of Organization, supra note 157 (patents 
as facilitating specialization); Heald, supra note 20 (discussing the role of patents in 
solving team production problems and facilitating technology transfer through transaction 
cost savings); Kieff, supra note 20 (focusing on the role of patents in facilitating 
coordination among many diverse complementary users of an asset in a way that increases 
competition and access).  
 159. See, e.g., Henry Chesbrough, Open Innovation: A New Paradigm for 
Understanding Industrial Innovation, in OPEN INNOVATION: RESEARCHING A NEW 
PARADIGM (Henry Chesbrough, Wim Vanhaverbeke & Joel West eds., 2006) (defining open 
innovation as “a paradigm that assumes that firms can and should use external ideas as 
well as internal ideas, and internal and external paths to market, as they look to advance 
their technology”); see also Barnett, Law of Organization, supra note 157. 
 160. See, e.g., Robert P. Merges, Institutions for Intellectual Property Transactions: The 
Case of Patent Pools, BERKELEY L. (1999), https://2048.berkeley.edu/files/pools.pdf. 
 161. See, e.g., Amy Kapczynski et al., Addressing Global Health Inequities: An Open 
Licensing Approach for University Innovations, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1031 (2005); Peter 
Lee, Contracting To Preserve Open Science: Consideration-Based Regulation in Patent Law, 
58 EMORY L.J. 889, 915 (2009).  
 162. See, e.g., Schultz & Urban, supra note 109.  
 163. See, e.g., Robert P. Merges, A New Dynamism in the Public Domain, 71 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 183 (2004) (examining private efforts to self-correct for excesses of patents).  
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nisms important to some forms of cooperative innovation. The doctri-
nal tools available to support collaboration remain tethered to a mar-
ket-based, producer-driven model of innovation. They do little to sup-
port the kinds of exchanges that are needed in a volunteer-driven 
system of combined intellectual production. In many cases, the pri-
vate measures are inherently incomplete, primarily or even solely 
defensive in nature, and often extremely expensive.164 Some of the 
strategies used to preserve openness may even backfire if patents 
obtained for defensive purposes later become litigation tools.  
 Despite mitigating doctrines and private market responses,165  
patents as currently enforced can and do systematically and signifi-
cantly disadvantage some forms of cooperative innovation.166 Since  
it is effectively impossible to opt out of the patent system, change 
may be needed from within patent law to give forms of cooperative 
innovation that are vulnerable to patents a chance to compete.167  In 
addition, the public nature of a change in the law might have expres-
sive effects missing from private efforts to circumvent the law, effects 
that would help to strengthen group norms and values important to 
cooperative systems.168   
 In Part IV, I propose one way for courts to respond to the vulnera-
bilities of cooperative innovation systems without radically changing 
 
 164. See, e.g., Asay, supra note 109, at 805 (describing the costs involved in trying to 
preserve open systems of knowledge exchange through private orderings); Mattioli, supra 
note 17, at 108 (examining question of whether patent sharing reflects a form of market 
self-regulation, and critiquing view that private ordering can always correct for excessive 
apportionment of patent rights). 
 165. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. & FED. TRADE COMM’N, ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR 
THE LICENSING OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY §§ 3.4, 4, and 5.6 (1995), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/0558.pdf (discussing the use of the rule of 
reason to evaluate various kinds of IP agreements and arrangements); Sheila F. Anthony, 
Antitrust and Intellectual Property Law: From Adversaries to Partners, 28 AIPLA Q.J. 1 
(2000) (discussing intersection of IP and antitrust, key focus of antitrust on precompetitive 
nature of various agreements and arrangements involving IP). 
 166. For example, as work by Nobel Prize winner Elinor Ostrom and others on the 
management of common pool resources has shown, external legal rights that control alloca-
tions within the group may interfere with valuable non-market forms of cooperation that 
could achieve better collective outcomes. See, e.g., UNDERSTANDING KNOWLEDGE AS A 
COMMONS, supra note 31, at 7 (including design principles for managing the production of 
knowledge, viewed as a common pool resource; emphasizing importance of trust and reci-
procity in sustaining cooperative systems; and emphasizing role of locally designed rules). 
 167. See, e.g., Schultz & Urban, supra note 109, at 10. 
 168. See, e.g., Jeanne C. Fromer, Expressive Incentives in Intellectual Property, 98 VA. L. 
REV. 1745, 1746 (2012) (exploring the role of expressive incentives, those that express 
solicitude for and protect a creator’s strong personhood and labor interests, in patent law); 
Timothy R. Holbrook, The Expressive Impact of Patents, 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 573, 613 (2006) 
(exploring the expressive impact that patent law can have, looking at how the grant of a 
patent could communicate a message of inferiority to groups whose identity is tied to their 
biology); William Hubbard, Inventing Norms, 44 CONN. L. REV. 369, 391 (2011) (arguing that 
patent law has an important role to play in supporting “inventing norms” and that these 
inventing norms should be incorporated into traditional patent law analysis).  
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the patent system. Recent pressures on the patent system fueled by 
patent wars over the use of critical technology standards have creat-
ed opportunities to make room for cooperative innovation in discus-
sions about patent remedies. Rather than adding to the costs and un-
certainties associated with broader judicial discretion in patent rem-
edies, the principles I suggest might even act to limit existing uncer-
tainties by providing a focal point for how patent remedies should be 
adjusted and limiting the areas in which they are to be adjusted.   
IV.   PATENT REMEDIES WITH COOPERATION IN MIND  
 Patent remedies have become the topic of increasing public inter-
est and debate as the social costs of patent litigation mount and the 
divergence of public and private interests in laws governing patent 
remedies become more apparent.169 In the pages that follow I show 
why, when, and how we should make patent remedies more respon-
sive to the needs of cooperative innovation.   
A.   Remedies Without Context   
 Patent remedies have historically been based on measuring and 
awarding reasonable compensation for past infringement to the own-
er of a valid, infringed patent, generally accompanied by injunctive 
relief to preclude future infringement.170 The patent owner has been 
entitled to no less than a reasonable royalty, generally defined as the 
royalty that a willing licensor and licensee would have agreed to at the 
time of the initial infringement.171 Historically, courts would also rou-
tinely provide the plaintiff patent owner with injunctive relief preclud-
 
 169. See James Boyle, Open Source Innovation, Patent Injunctions, and the Public Inter-
est, 11 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 30 (2012); Thomas F. Cotter, Reining in Remedies in Patent 
Litigation: Three (Increasingly Immodest) Proposals, 30 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH 
TECH. L.J. 1 (2014); Ghosh, supra note 135; Golden, supra note 18, at 507 (“In legislative de-
bates, public-choice concerns loom large, as proposed reforms appear commonly to track pri-
vate, rather than necessarily public, interests.”); Megan M. La Belle, Patent Law As Public 
Law, 20 GEO. MASON L. REV. 41 (2012); Rajec, supra note 19; Sichelman, supra note 19. 
 170. See also 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2006). The Patent Act provides that the owner of a valid, 
infringed patent is entitled to damages that are “adequate to compensate for the infringement, 
but in no event less than a reasonable royalty for the use made of the invention by the 
infringer” with the possibility of punitive damages for willful infringement. Id. 
 171. See, e.g., Christopher B. Seaman, Reconsidering the Georgia-Pacific Standard for 
Reasonable Royalty Patent Damages, 2011 BYU L. REV. 1661, 1676-81 (discussing Federal 
Circuit approach to reasonable royalties). Monetary remedies for patent infringement may 
take the form of either lost profits or lost royalties. In practice, however, determining what the 
appropriate monetary remedies are has been “a complicated and confusing task.”  Roger D. 
Blair & Thomas F. Cotter, Rethinking Patent Damages, 10 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L. J. 1, 2 (2001) 
(providing overview of traditional approaches to lost profits and reasonable royalties and 
suggesting economic framework to aid in rethinking how patent damages are calculated).  
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ing further infringing activity by the defendant.172 This approach to 
patent remedies aligns roughly with the reward function of patents 
within the traditional paradigm of producer-driven, market-based in-
novation. Focusing on compensation to the patent owner, however, 
may result in patent remedies that decrease rather than increase in-
novation in some contexts of cooperative intellectual production.173    
 One of the biggest limitations of the traditional approach to patent 
remedies has been its focus on the interests of the patent owner, to 
the exclusion of the interests of additional participants in the innova-
tion process and the broader public interests in socially optimal levels 
of innovation.174 Interests beyond those of the patent owner, including 
both the infringer and the public more generally, started to play a 
bigger role in the calculation of patent remedies following the Su-
preme Court decision in eBay v. MercExchange in 2006.175 The Su-
preme Court held in eBay that injunctive relief in patent cases, just 
as in other types of cases, should not be presumed but rather should 
be determined based on the conventional four-factor test for injunc-
tive relief.176 The Supreme Court thus shifted the calculus used by 
courts when determining whether to award injunctive relief to the 
owner of an infringed patent by requiring courts to take the harm of 
an injunction to the public and the defendant explicitly into ac-
count.177 Justice Kennedy’s influential concurring opinion went on to 
 
 172. See, e.g., Richardson v. Suzuki Motor Co., 868 F.2d 1226, 1247 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (“It 
is the general rule that an injunction will issue when infringement has been adjudged, 
absent a sound reason for denying it.”). 
 173. See, e.g., Ted Sichelman, Purging Patent Law of “Private Law” Remedies, 92 TEX. 
L. REV. 517 (2014); see also Boyle, supra note 169, at 32-34 (outlining some of the ways in 
which open source innovation is particularly vulnerable to patent injunctions); Thomas R. 
Cotter, Make No Little Plans: Response to Ted Sichelman, Purging Patent Law of “Private 
Law” Remedies, 92 TEX. L. REV. 25 (2014); Paul J. Heald, Optimal Remedies for Patent 
Infringement: A Transactional Model, 45 HOUS. L. REV. 1165 (2008). 
 174. Patent remedies take the form of injunctive relief and damages. Damages are 
based on calculations of loss to the patent owner, either in the form of a patent owner’s lost 
profits, price erosion, or reasonable royalties. See, e.g., THOMAS F. COTTER, COMPARATIVE 
PATENT REMEDIES: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (2013) (comprehensively discussing 
patent remedies in the United States and selected other countries). The works referenced 
in footnote 171 highlight various limitations of the traditional approach to remedies taken 
by the courts.   
 175. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388, 394 (2006) (holding that the well-
established principles of equitable relief apply with equal force to disputes under the 
Patent Act).  
 176. Id. at 391-93. This case replaced the Federal Circuit’s “general rule” in favor of 
granting injunctions based on a presumption of irreparable harm with a required 
balancing of interests. To obtain injunctive relief, the plaintiff must show that it has 
suffered irreparable harm, remedies available under the law are inadequate to 
compensate, the balance of hardships associated with injunctive relief favor the plaintiff, 
and the public interest will not suffer by the issuance of the requested injunction. Id. 
 177. See, e.g., FED. TRADE COMM’N, THE EVOLVING IP MARKETPLACE: ALIGNING PATENT 
NOTICE AND REMEDIES WITH COMPETITION 253 (2011) [hereinafter FTC REPORT]; see also 
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suggest specific situations in which district courts might find injunc-
tive relief inappropriate, such as patent assertion by non-practicing 
entities and situations of patent holdup.178  
 While eBay has made the role of the public interest explicit in de-
terminations of injunctive relief, the case fails to provide principles to 
guide courts in their determinations of what the public interest is or 
how it should be measured.179 Courts have taken into account a 
greater variety of factors when determining whether an injunction 
should be awarded, although many of these considerations remain 
focused on whether the patent owner will suffer irreparable harm 
due to the infringement through loss of market share, price erosion, 
difficulty in calculating damages, or harm to reputation or good-
will.180 Whether the patent owner and infringer compete and whether 
the patent owner is a practicing entity appear to be important but 
not determining factors in predicting the availability of injunctive 
relief, and factors such as market structure and the relationship of 
the patented invention to the infringing product increasingly inform 
court decisions.181 Despite the more contextualized analysis of the 
effects of infringement and injunctive relief, however, detailed analy-
sis of the effects of injunctive relief on the broader public interest  
 
Mark P. Gergen, John M. Golden & Henry E. Smith, The Supreme Court’s Accidental 
Revolution? The Test for Permanent Injunctions, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 203, 204-05 (2012) 
(suggesting that the eBay case has launched a revolution in the law of equitable remedies 
beyond patent law). 
 178. See, e.g., eBay Inc., 547 U.S. at 395-97 (Kennedy, J., concurring).  
 179. See, e.g., FTC REPORT, supra note 177, at 255 (“After enumerating the four 
equitable factors in the eBay decision, the opinion of the full Court gave little guidance on 
their application.”); see also Scott A. Allen, “Justifying” the Public Interest in Patent 
Litigation, 88 IND. L.J. 1047, 1051 (2013). 
 180. FTC REPORT, supra note 177, at 215 (discussing the ways in which courts have 
considered and applied the four factors in the test for injunctive relief); see also James M. 
Fischer, What Hath eBay v. MercExchange Wrought?, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 555, 564-65 
(2010); Stephen E. Noona, Permanent Injunctions for Patent Infringement in a Post eBay 
World, INSIDE BUS. (Dec. 9, 2010, 4:12 AM), http://insidebiz.com/blogs/kaufman-canoles/ 
permanent-injunctions-patent-infringement-post-ebay-world; Bryan J. Vogel & Shane St. 
Hill, IP: Injunctions and Irreparable Harm After eBay, INSIDECOUNSEL (June 19, 2012), 
http://www.insidecounsel.com/2012/06/19/ip-injunctions-and-irreparable-harm-after-ebay.  
 181. See, e.g., FTC REPORT, supra note 177, at 259 (showing results of survey of case 
law); see also eBay, 547 U.S. at 393 (Supreme Court’s warning against categorical rules in 
injunction analysis); Andrew Beckerman-Rodau, The Aftermath of eBay v. MercExchange, 
126 S. Ct. 1837 (2006): A Review of Subsequent Judicial Decisions, 89 J. PAT. & 
TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 631 (2007); Bernard H. Chao, After eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange: 
The Changing Landscape for Patent Remedies, 9 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 543 (2008) 
(arguing the importance of factors such as whether infringer is a competitor and showing of 
irreparable harm in post-eBay cases). For a more recent update that largely affirms the 
importance of whether the parties were competitors and the ability to show irreparable 
harm, see, for example, Barbara A. Fiacco, The Impact of eBay v. MercExchange, 
Presentation at the Duke Pat. Law Inst. (May 16, 2013) (presentation available at 
http://law.duke.edu/sites/default/files/centers/judicialstudies/patentlawintensive/Fiacco-Ma 
y%2016%20eBay%20v%20MercExchange.pdf). 
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remains rare except in situations in which injunctions would have 
severe consequences for public health and safety or would significant-
ly disrupt markets, or more recently in situations where patents  
cover important industry standards.182 Instead of conducting a broad-
er inquiry into the effects of injunctions on innovation, some courts 
still simply equate the public interest with supporting innovation 
through a strong patent system.183 Although injunctive relief is  
no longer routine in the wake of eBay, injunctive relief seems to be 
based most frequently on a showing of irreparable harm to the patent 
owner and continues to be granted in the majority of cases.184  Thus, 
while determinations of injunctive relief following eBay have moved 
patent remedies in the direction of reflecting a richer range of  
entitlements, I suggest that courts still have not adequately captured 
the public interest in limiting injunctive relief or given it sufficient 
context or weight.  
 This limited approach to the public interest may be starting to 
change, particularly in the context of cases involving patents that are 
essential to the use of important industry-wide technology stand-
 
 182. See, e.g., FTC REPORT, supra note 177, at 232-34 (discussing the role of public 
interest, including survey of cases that address public interest explicitly as part of decision 
to award or deny injunctive relief). Greater attention to the public interest does seem to 
occur in cases involving substantial network effects that are threatened by patents. See, 
e.g., Apple, Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 909 F. Supp. 2d 1147, 1163 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (taking 
impact on consumers into account and denying injunctive relief despite status of parties as 
direct competitors); Apple Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 735 F.3d 1352, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2013) 
(affirming District Court’s denial of injunctive relief despite status of parties as direct com-
petitors for design patents, but vacating denial of injunctive relief for utility patents).  
 183. FTC REPORT, supra note 177, at 270-271 (“Only a small number of post-eBay cases 
have provided an extended discussion of this factor in deciding whether to grant an 
injunction. In the majority of cases, courts simply recognize that the ‘public has an interest 
in maintaining a strong patent system. This interest is served by enforcing an adequate 
remedy for patent infringement.’ ” (quoting TiVo Inc. v. Echostar Commc’ns Corp., 446 F. 
Supp. 2d 664, 670 (E.D. Tex. 2006)); see also, e.g., Pozen Inc. v. Par Pharm., Inc., 800 F. 
Supp. 2d 789, 825 (E.D. Tex. 2011) (reasoning that an injunction served the public interest 
because it encouraged innovation by upholding patent owner’s “right to exclude”); Zen 
Design Grp., Ltd. v. Clint, No. 08-cv-14309, 2009 WL 4050247, at *6 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 23, 
2009) (reasoning that a permanent injunction served the public interest because, without 
it, the patent’s actual value would be reduced to “a fraction of its intended value”); Funai 
Elecs. Co., Ltd. v. Daewoo Elecs. Corp., 593 F. Supp. 2d 1088, 1111 (N.D. Cal. 2009) 
(“Protection of the rights of patent holders is generally in the public interest.”). 
 184. See, e.g., FTC REPORT, supra note 177, at 217-218 (“Surveys of post-eBay cases 
reveal that district courts have granted approximately 72%–77% of permanent injunction 
requests.”); see also Ernest Grumbles III et al., The Three Year Anniversary of eBay v. 
MercExchange: A Statistical Analysis of Permanent Injunctions, INTELL. PROP. TODAY, Nov. 
2009, at 25, 26 (noting that seventy two percent of requests were granted through May 1, 
2009, based on review of decisions available through Lexis); Erin Coe, Injunctions Harder To 
Win in Post-EBay Courts, LAW360 (Oct. 30, 2008, 12:00 AM), http://www.law360.com/ 
articles/74829/injunctions-harder-to-win-in-post-ebay-courts; Post-eBay Permanent Injunction 
Rulings in Patent Cases, PATSTATS.ORG, http://www.patstats.org/Patstats2.html (last 
updated May 26, 2013) (showing that injunctions were granted in 167 cases and denied in 
55 cases, that is, granted seventy-five percent of the time).   
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ards.185 In a series of high-profile patent infringement cases involving 
patents covering technology standards used in the smartphone in-
dustry, courts have had to consider whether injunctive relief should 
be available where patent owners have previously agreed to license 
patents essential to the use of these standards on reasonable and 
non-discriminatory terms.  In one of the first court decisions to weigh 
in on this matter, Judge Posner suggested that injunctive relief 
should not be available, emphasizing the harm to the public interest 
that such relief would impose.186 Judge Posner went on to suggest 
that if the patent owner and infringer cannot agree on licensing 
terms, compulsory licensing with ongoing royalties should be used to 
resolve the dispute in a way that appropriately balances the harm to 
the patentee from infringement with the harm to the infringer and to 
the public from an injunction.187 This approach focuses explicitly on 
what the public interest is and how it should be reflected in determi-
nations of patent remedies in standard setting contexts.188 While 
Judge Posner’s willingness to radically reshape how remedies are 
calculated diverges from the mainstream,189 his underlying message 
about the need to reconsider patent remedies in contexts where they 
may threaten important forms of coordination and cooperation is be-
ing taken seriously by policymakers. So far, however, this reconsid-
 
 185. For an optimistic view of this change more generally, see, for example, Boyle, 
supra note 169. On the other hand, one fragmented opinion from the Federal Circuit 
illustrates the divergence of views held by judges in that court about when injunctive 
relieve should be available in the context of patents covering important industry standards. 
See Apple Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., Nos. 12-1548, 12-1549, 2014 WL 1646435, at *30-35 (Fed. 
Cir. April 25, 2014); id. at *36-37 (Rader, C.J., dissenting in part); id. at *43-46 (Prost, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part).  
 186. See Apple, Inc. v. Motorola, Inc. 869 F. Supp. 2d 901, 913-14 (N.D. Ill. 2012), aff’d 
in part, rev’d in part, Apple Inc., 2014 WL 1646435. (suggesting that the purpose of the 
fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory terms (FRAND) requirement is “to confine the 
patentee’s royalty demand to the value conferred by the patent itself as distinct from the 
additional value—the hold-up value—conferred by the patent’s being designated as 
standard-essential”).  But see Apple, Inc., 2014 WL 1646435, at *35 (affirming Judge 
Posner’s ruling that this particular holder of the patent subject to FRAND requirements 
was not entitled to injunctive relief, but insisting that eBay analysis of factors, with 
particular attention to whether patent holder will suffer irreparable harm as a result of the 
infringement, is required). 
 187. Apple Inc., 869 F. Supp. 2d at 918.  
 188. See eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388, 395-97 (2006) (Kennedy,  
J., concurring). 
 189. See, e.g., Gene Quinn, Chief Judge Rader on the Supreme Court and Judge Posner, 
IPWATCHDOG (Mar. 17, 2013, 12:07 PM), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2013/03/17/chief-
judge-rader-on-the-supreme-court-and-judge-posner/id=37620/; see also Apple, Inc., 2014 
WL 1646435, at *35 (holding that Judge Posner erred in his district court opinion by 
applying “a per se rule that injunctions are unavailable for [standard-essential patents]”); 
id. at *36-37 (Rader, C.J., dissenting in part) (reasoning that the district court’s failure to 
consider the appropriate factors left it “adrift without a map”); id. at *45 (Prost, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (rejecting the district court’s “categorical rule 
that a patentee can never obtain an injunction on a FRAND-committed patent”). 
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eration has been limited primarily to the context of standard-
essential patents encumbered by contractual commitments to license 
on reasonable and non-discriminatory terms.190   
 Calculations of patent damages have also moved in the direction 
of a more contextualized analysis, driven largely by decisions in the 
standard setting context. In the first court decision to confront and 
calculate reasonable and non-discriminatory royalties for patents es-
sential to the use of industry standards, Judge Robart concluded in 
Microsoft v. Motorola that the traditional factors used to determine 
reasonable royalties, referred to as the Georgia-Pacific factors, should 
be explicitly modified to take the standard-setting context into ac-
count.191 Judge Robart, as Judge Posner had before him, emphasized 
the importance of the public interest in access to the standards and 
 
 190. Judge Posner’s approach in Apple v. Motorola is contrasted with Judge Robart’s 
ruling on FRAND damages in Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., No. C10-1823JLR, 2013 
WL 2111217, at *18-19 (W.D. Wash. April 25, 2013). Areas of divergence include Judge 
Robart’s reliance on the traditional Georgia-Pacific factors as a good way of calculating 
patent damages, and Judge Posner’s rejection of this framework. Compare id. 
(summarizing Judge Robart’s position), with Apple, Inc., 869 F. Supp. 2d at 910-11 (giving 
Judge Posner’s take). Judge Posner also insists that the FRAND value of a standard-
essential patent should be determined ex ante, pre-standardization, as compared to the 
traditional approach based on the date that infringement began. See, e.g., Florian Mueller, 
A Closer Look at the 207-Page, Landmark FRAND Rate-Setting Decision in Microsoft v. 
Motorola, FOSS PATENTS (Apr. 28, 2013, 11:49 PM), http://www.fosspatents.com/2013/04/a-
closer-look-at-207-page-landmark.html#judgesrobartandposner. Both decisions, however, 
point to the importance of the public interest in access to standard-essential patents  
and the need to exclude the holdup value of patents covering standards from  
royalty determinations.  
 191. See, e.g., Microsoft Corp., 2013 WL 2111217, at *1, 18 (deciding in contract dispute 
over whether Motorola had breached contract to offer patents on FRAND terms by asking 
for royalties that were unreasonably high). Judge Robart’s decision seems to explicitly 
modify the traditional Georgia-Pacific factors to account for the standard-setting context. 
Id. at *18-20. He recognizes that the licensing of standard-essential patents takes on a 
public character and must be conducted and reviewed with those public benefits in mind. 
He emphasizes, for example, that patent royalties should not incorporate the holdup value 
that may result after a standard incorporating the patent has been chosen, and attention 
to royalty stacking. Id.; see also Thomas F. Cotter, Some Initial Reactions to Judge Robart’s 
Opinion in Microsoft v. Motorola, INTELLECTUALIP (May 3, 2013), http://intellectual 
ip.com/2013/05/03/some-initial-reactions-to-judge-robarts-opinion-in-microsoft-v-motorola/; 
Michael Carrier, A US Court Issues First Analysis of an Appropriate Royalty that a 
Patentee Could Obtain After Promising To License Its Patent on Reasonable and 
Nondiscriminatory (RAND) Terms (Microsoft v Motorola), E-COMPETITIONS BULL. (Inst. of 
Competition Law, New York, N.Y.), May 2013; Jorge L. Contreras, So That’s What “RAND” 
Means?: A Brief Report on the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law in Microsoft v. 
Motorola, PATENTLY-O (Apr. 27, 2013), http://patentlyo.com/patent/2013/04/so-thats-what-
rand-means-a-brief-report-on-the-findings-of-fact-and-conclusions-of-law-in-microsoft-v-
motorola.html; Thomas F. Cotter, Day 2 of the University of Florida Workshop on Standard 
Essential Patents and FRAND: Page on “Judging Monopolistic Pricing: F/RAND and 
Antitrust Injury”, COMP. PAT. REMEDIES BLOG (Sept. 12, 2013), http://comparativepat 
entremedies.blogspot.com/2013/09/day-2-of-university-of-florida-workshop_12.html (summ-
arizing comments by William Page suggesting that while the form of FRAND royalties was 
as a hypothetical bilateral negotiation, in reality it was a calculation in light of the 
economic consensus of what FRAND rates should be).     
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the need to exclude any patent holdup value arising from the collec-
tive adoption of a standard covered by the patent from the calculation 
of damages. Judge Robart’s approach, including the emphasis on ex-
cluding the value of standardization in royalty determinations, has 
been followed in a second court ruling on reasonable and non-
discriminatory royalty rates.192 Recognizing the strong public interest 
in using standards as mechanisms for coordinating interoperable 
technologies, the Federal Trade Commission, the Department of Jus-
tice, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, and even the U.S. Trade 
Representative have all offered similar opinions about limiting in-
junctive relief and damages.193 Courts and policymakers alike are 
thus emphasizing the public interest in preserving access to innova-
tive standards, and their responses illustrate ways in which the 
broader effects of patent remedies on cooperation in innovation can 
be incorporated into remedy determinations.194 So far, however, they 
remain limited primarily to patents essential to common industry 
technology standards.195 They also remain focused primarily on de-
terminations of injunctive relief and damages for past infringement, 
leaving open questions about whether the public interest will similar-
 
 192. See In re Innovatio IP Ventures, LLC Patent Litig., 921 F. Supp. 2d 903, 915-17 
(N.D. Ill. 2013); see also Michael Carrier, A US Court Issues Second Ruling Determining 
RAND Rate for Standard Essential Patent (Innovatio), E-COMPETITIONS BULL. (Inst. of 
Competition Law, New York, N.Y.), Oct. 2013.  
 193. See, e.g., Editorial Board, FTC/DOJ/USPTO Take Action on Standards-Essential 
Patents, ANTITRUST & COMPETITION NEWSL., ORRICK (Feb. 4, 2013), http://blogs.orrick.com/ 
antitrust/2013/02/04/dojftcuspto-take-action-on-standards-essential-patents/ (summarizing 
recent actions by FTC, DOJ, and USPTO with regard to standard-essential patents); John 
Ribeiro, Google Withdraws Standard-Essential Patent Claims in Xbox Complaint, 
COMPUTERWORLD (Jan. 9 2013, 12:20 PM), http://www.computerworld.com/s/article/ 
9235502/google_withdraws_standard_essential_patent_claims_in_Xbox_complaint; see also 
Letter from Michael B.G. Froman, Ambassador, Exec. Off. of the President, to Irving A. 
Williamson, Chairman, U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n (Aug. 3, 2013) available at 
http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/08032013%20Letter_1.PDF (discussing a policy 
decision to disapprove Commission’s determination to enjoin Apple from importing and 
selling infringing devices, after review in light of public interest concerns). 
 194. See, e.g., Thomas F. Cotter, Remedies for the Infringement of Standard Essential 
Patents Subject to a FRAND Commitment, COMP. PAT. REMEDIES BLOG (May 8, 2013, 9:40 
AM), http://comparativepatentremedies.blogspot.com/2013/05/remedies-for-infringement-
of-standard.html.  
 195. Existing proposals in the literature focus primarily on risks of patent holdup and 
related forms of opportunistic behavior by patent holders. See, e.g., Cotter, supra note 19; 
Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking, 85 TEX. L. REV. 
1991 (2007); Mark A. Lemley, Ten Things To Do About Patent Holdup of Standards (and 
One Not To), 48 B.C. L. REV. 149 (2007); Robert P. Merges & Jeffrey M. Kuhn, An Estoppel 
Doctrine for Patented Standards, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 1 (2009); Joseph Scott Miller, Standard 
Setting, Patents, and Access Lock-in: RAND Licensing and the Theory of the Firm, 40 IND. 
L. REV. 351 (2007). While I am also concerned with patent holdup, my concerns extend to 
other ways in which patents might interfere with cooperative innovation, and my goal is to 
limit patent remedies when, and to the extent, that the presence of patents makes useful 
cooperative systems of innovation unviable.  
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ly inform determinations of ongoing royalties where injunctive relief 
is denied.196 
 These responses to cooperative contexts, while creating opportuni-
ties to inject broader public interests into determinations of patent 
remedies, leave open important questions about how tensions be-
tween patents and systems that rely more heavily on non-market 
mechanisms of cooperation should be handled. They address only 
problems arising from commercial participants in standard setting 
organizations who do not honor their obligations to each other relat-
ing to standard-essential patents. They limit their focus to the poten-
tial harms to the public from refusals of both patent-holding mem-
bers of standard setting and the users of patented standards to nego-
tiate licenses to patents essential to innovative standards on terms 
that are reasonable and non-discriminatory. Moreover, they fail to 
acknowledge or protect the public interest in sustaining non-market 
mechanisms of cooperation that are valuable to innovation. The prin-
ciples proposed below are largely consistent with but go further than 
existing policy responses. They provide the courts with a way of sys-
tematically incorporating the harm that patents impose on coopera-
tive systems into determinations of patent remedies.197  
B.   Principles for the Design of Remedies   
 Where patent rights impact systems of cooperative innovation, 
these negative effects should be included in determinations of patent 
remedies.198 As the examples of Foldit and open source software 
demonstrated, three key non-market mechanisms play important 
roles in sustaining cooperative innovation: trust, benefit-sharing, and 
reciprocity.199 Patents under the current system directly threaten 
 
 196. See, e.g., Thomas F. Cotter, Four Principles for Calculating Reasonable Royalties 
in Patent Infringement Litigation, 27 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 725 
(2011); Mark A. Lemley, The Ongoing Confusion over Ongoing Royalties, 76 MO. L. REV. 
695 (2011); see also Thomas F. Cotter, U.S. District Court Awards Carnegie Mellon $1.5 
Billion in Patent Damages, COMP. PAT. REMEDIES BLOG (Apr. 21, 2014), http://comparative 
patentremedies.blogspot.com/2014/04/us-district-court-awards-carnegie.html (suggesting 
decision not to award a higher ongoing royalty than the reasonable royalties awarded for 
past infringement is consistent with view that courts should take socially optimal 
incentives to innovate into account). 
 197. Ideally this is just a first step in thinking more systematically about where 
patent laws need to change in response to changing forms of collaborative and 
cooperative innovation.     
 198. For a related discussion and insights into the challenges of cumulative and 
sequential innovation and the disconnect with current approaches to patent remedies, see, 
for example, J. H. Reichman, Of Green Tulips and Legal Kudzu: Repackaging Rights in 
Subpatentable Innovation, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1743 (2000). For a similar discussion focusing 
on open source innovation, see, for example, James Boyle, supra note 169. 
 199. As noted earlier, there are other important aspects of cooperative innovation 
systems that may not be fully captured by these three mechanisms. I focus on them for  
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each of these mechanisms, putting such cooperative innovation sys-
tems at risk. In response, I provide three principles for courts to use 
in determining patent remedies that are designed to protect the op-
eration of these mechanisms in situations of socially beneficial coop-
erative innovation. The three principles are: (1) protect reliance in-
terests in norms of open access and sharing;200 (2) limit the private 
appropriation of collective value;201 and (3) reinforce reciprocity in 
free, open systems of innovation. Where the negative effects of pa-
tents on cooperative mechanisms are likely to be strong, the princi-
ples provide a reasoned way of incorporating these patent harms into 
determinations of patent remedies. This approach would lead not on-
ly to changes in how courts determine remedies for patents that arise 
from or cover the activities of cooperative systems of innovation, but 
also, and more importantly, to changes in ex ante decisions by mem-
bers of a cooperative innovation system about whether to defect from 
the system and decisions by third parties about whether and when to 
obtain and enforce patents against members of the cooperative sys-
tem in the first place.202 It is these ex ante effects on decisions to de-
 
the purpose of this analysis because they seem to play an important role in many of  
the cooperative systems and also seem to capture many of the effects that patents  
might have on the rich variety of non-economic factors and motivations that drive 
cooperative innovation.   
 200. The idea of respecting the reliance interests of firms in standards that are adopted 
by the industry has been suggested in Merges & Kuhn, supra note 195. This principle goes 
further, extending to any situation in which multiple participants work collectively to 
advance a particular product or field and either must coordinate their activities through 
standards and/or find it necessary to use certain core technologies as research tools or 
platform technologies on which to build their contributions. There are also similarities here 
to an essential-facilities doctrine approach to intellectual property. See, e.g., M. Elaine 
Johnston, Intellectual Property As an “Essential Facility”, 22 COMPUTER & INTERNET L. 17 
(2005) (summarizing case law and trends in applying essential-facilities doctrine to 
intellectual property contexts). Jorge Contreras proposes a “market reliance” approach in 
the context of promises not to assert patents on FRAND terms, focusing on the importance 
of protecting the reasonable reliance of third-party market participants on such promises. 
His work provides additional ideas about how this kind of principle might work in the 
context of cooperative innovation. See Jorge L. Contreras, Market Reliance and Patent 
Pledges, UTAH L. REV. (forthcoming Spring 2015), available at http://ssrn.com/ 
abstract=2309023.  
 201. See, e.g., Cotter, supra note 169 (arguing that damages should be apportioned 
according to relative value of patent to the whole product); Lemley & Shapiro, supra  
note 195 (exploring problems of patent holdup, royalty-stacking, and consequent  
royalty overcharges). 
 202. The principles will have the effect of limiting injunctive relief and patent damages 
in ways that reduce the payoffs that group members might expect from defecting and their 
expectations that others might defect. This will, in turn, reduce the incentives of group 
members to defect from the group in the first place, and will also strengthen the 
motivations of group members to continue to adhere to group norms of open access and 
sharing. The principles will also limit the ability of outside parties to appropriate the value 
arising from collective efforts and their ability to threaten the activities of the group. Third 
parties will have lower expected payoffs from asserting or threatening to assert patents 
against the group in contexts where they are seeking to tax or free ride on the collective 
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fect and decisions to threaten and enforce patents against the group 
that are most important to the survival of cooperative innovation.  
 1.   First Principle  
 The first principle requires courts to protect reliance interests in 
norms of open access and sharing. Where the norms are supporting 
socially valuable innovation, reliance interests in continued access  
to an invention based on this norm should be treated as part of the 
public interest in continued access, to be balanced against the  
interests of a patent owner in restricting access when fashioning pa-
tent remedies.203 To receive protection, the reliance must be reasona-
ble in light of widely adopted and publicly known norms governing 
when and how knowledge will be shared and used. It must be reli-
ance on a norm of open access and sharing that is relevant to the co-
operative process of innovation. Defining what is reasonable reliance 
would thus be context-specific, depending on the scope and nature of 
the norms and customs of the innovation community, the extent to 
which these norms are publicly known, the relationship of the inven-
tor and patent owner to the community, and the balancing of collec-
tive interests in access and private incentives to make and develop 
the patented technology.   
 This approach provides courts with a way of respecting and rein-
forcing informal rules that establish socially beneficial uses of 
knowledge by giving them weight when balancing public and private 
interests. Pursuant to this principle, reasonable reliance on norms of 
open access and sharing would become an important factor that 
weighs against injunctive relief. This reliance would also become a 
factor limiting damages for infringement of patented inventions that 
are used in the context of cooperative innovation.204 Calculations of 
reasonable royalties should be lower where reliance interests are 
 
efforts of the group and less bargaining power in situations where injunctive relief is likely 
to be unavailable. This may discourage them from asserting claims or making threats and 
will also limit the deterrent effects of potential third-party claims on participation rates in 
cooperative-innovation projects. Where licenses are required, third parties will settle for 
lower royalties based on expectations that courts will limit injunctive relief and damages.  
 203. This principle finds support in studies of the role that informal norms play in 
knowledge communities. See, e.g., Robert P. Merges, From Medieval Guilds to Open Source 
Software: Informal Norms, Appropriability Institutions, and Innovation (Univ. of Wis. Law 
Sch. Conf. on the Legal Hist. of Intell. Prop., Working Paper, 2004). 
 204. For discussions of the effects of patents on norms, see, for example, Merges, supra 
note 68; Katherine J. Strandburg, User Innovator Community Norms: At the Boundary 
Between Academic and Industry Research, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2237 (2009) (exploring 
implications of convergence of academic research with commercial interests and 
implications for norms of sharing research tools and materials and suggesting need for 
policies to enhance sharing); Murray & Stern, supra note 25; Fiona Murray, The 
Oncomouse that Roared: Resistance & Accommodation to Patenting in Academic Science 
(March 2006) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). 
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higher and royalties should reflect the economic constraints of the 
group. Courts would apply this principle with the goal of reducing the 
attractiveness for members of a cooperative system to deviate from 
sharing norms, and to limit at least some of the third-party actions 
that increase the cost of adhering to group norms of sharing. While 
finding a way to measure and account for this reliance interest will 
be difficult, courts, as a starting point, can look to the emerging 
framework for determining when injunctive relief should be available 
and what reasonable and nondiscriminatory royalties are in the 
standard-setting context.    
 While existing doctrines of implied license and estoppel, as well as 
the shop rights that a company may have over its employees’ inven-
tions, go part of the way towards recognizing and protecting reasona-
ble reliance in continued group use of inventions, this first principle 
goes beyond the limits of these doctrines.205 The principle would en-
compass the reliance interests of participants who are not in contrac-
tual privity, or even in direct or indirect communication, with the pa-
tent owner, as long as the norms of open access and sharing that the 
group relies upon are widely adopted and publicly known and are as-
sociated with a socially valuable system of innovation. Protection of 
the reliance interest in continued use will be strongest for inventions 
discovered by members of the group that are used by the group. It 
will extend in a more limited way to inventions made by group mem-
bers working on independent projects entirely outside of the group, 
and in an even more limited way to inventions owned by third parties 
that the group uses. In these latter two cases, the reliance interest 
will play a role only for inventions that are both closely related and 
important to the activities of the group and additionally made acces-
sible to the group in ways that encourage, whether directly or indi-
rectly, widespread use by the group. If a software company benefits 
from Linux and makes available software tools with a reasonable ex-
pectation that members of the Linux community will pick up and 
widely use the tools, for example, the principle would limit the reme-
dies that the software company might expect from asserting patents 
covering this software.  The principle would also weigh against in-
junctive relief and limit damages in situations such as the general-
ized patent threats made by Microsoft to Linux users. Knowing that 
 
 205. See, e.g., Barnes & Noble, Inc. v. LSI Corp., 849 F. Supp. 2d 925, 939-40 (N.D. Cal. 
2012) (holding that a competitor’s adoption of set standards can constitute reasonable reli-
ance); Lautzenhiser Techs., LLC v. Sunrise Med. HHG, Inc., 752 F. Supp. 2d 988, 1009 
(S.D. Ind. 2010) (holding that amicable dealings over a period of years may be enough to 
constitute misleading conduct that induces reasonable reliance). Similar trends are evident 
in contract law, where courts are increasingly willing to protect reasonable reliance inter-
ests of negotiating parties prior to or in the absence of a final contract. See, e.g., Alan 
Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Precontractual Liability and Preliminary Agreements, 120 
HARV. L. REV. 661 (2007). 
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injunctive relief and remedies will be limited, Linux users would feel 
more comfortable continuing to participate in open source software, 
and Microsoft would find its divide-and-conquer strategies less effec-
tive. In contrast, this principle would not block injunctive relief or 
limit damages in situations of blatant copying of an independent pro-
prietary product for the purpose of making it open source.   
 Where established norms of open access and sharing govern intel-
lectual production and members have expectations of continued ac-
cess to and use of inventions based on these norms, protecting their 
reliance interests in this way makes it easier to maintain the swift 
trust that both open source software systems and crowd science sys-
tems rely on.206 Participants in cooperative innovation make contri-
butions and adhere to group rules with the expectation that others 
will do the same. Sustaining this kind of trust in the behavior of the 
group requires participation by most, if not almost all, members of 
the group. Anything that increases the ability and incentives of group 
members to defect from group norms will threaten this equilibrium 
state of general trust and make it harder to sustain norms of open 
access and free sharing. In the Linux example, one of the reasons 
that the license between Novell and Microsoft was so troubling to the 
open source community was its negative impact on expectations that 
open source norms would continue to govern open source software. 
Patents covering open source software provided Novell with an op-
portunity for significant private commercial gain, leading to a defec-
tion from open access norms. Not surprisingly, additional license 
deals between Microsoft and other open source software companies 
followed in the wake of the Novell deal.207 Without the backing and 
defensive patenting of large companies like IBM, such defections 
might have led to unraveling of cooperation and the future of Linux 
might have been questionable. While Linux survived, this survival 
has come at a high cost, both in terms of centralized corporate control 
over development paths and the costs of defensive patenting. Appli-
cation of this proposed principle would have limited the ability of 
Novell or any third party acquirer to obtain injunctive relief or dam-
ages from the assertion of Novell’s open source patents against the 
open source community. This would have made the patents less 
commercially attractive and reduced Novell’s incentives to defect.    
 In the context of Foldit, the commitment of the Foldit administra-
tors and Foldit players to ensuring that scientific discoveries and the 
 
 206. For a discussion of swift trust and its role in open source software communities, 
see Part II.A.  
 207. See, e.g., Mary Jo Foley, Microsoft and SUSE Extend Microsoft’s Controversial 
Novell Linux Pact, ZDNET (July 25, 2011), http://www.zdnet.com/blog/microsoft/ 
microsoft-and-suse-extend-microsofts-controversial-novell-linux-pact/10164; Paul Krill, 
supra note 110.   
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research tools that enable such discoveries are made publicly availa-
ble is critical to its success. Members of Foldit are willing to freely 
contribute their energy and ideas because they expect and believe 
both that other participants will behave similarly and that the re-
sults of their collective efforts will be freely shared with each other 
and with the scientific community. While defensive publishing of re-
sults may limit the ability of Foldit players to patent their discover-
ies, and claims of joint inventorship may limit the ability of any indi-
vidual to obtain exclusive control, much of what the game members 
contribute and share are software tools and problem solving tech-
niques rather than the ultimate discovery. Moreover, the fact that 
participants make their results public now does not mean that they 
will continue to do so if commercial considerations play a larger 
role.208 This additional protection is therefore necessary to protect 
Foldit norms of open and free sharing.  
 2.   Second Principle  
 The second principle is to limit the private appropriation of collec-
tive value by a patent owner, with the goal of supporting benefit-
sharing in contexts of cooperative innovation. The principle would 
limit patent remedies where patents are used to hold up group pro-
duction or extract rents from the group based on the group’s adoption 
and collective use of the invention.209 While this is analogous to the 
patent holdup concerns that arise when patents cover the use of 
standards adopted by industry members, it is broader, encompassing 
situations in which a group widely adopts and uses inventions that 
further the innovation objectives of the group. Concerns about the 
appropriation of collective value through patent holdup will be 
strongest in situations where the cost of switching to another tech-
nology would be high and where the fact that the group has used the 
patented invention has made it more valuable to the group and to 
people outside the group. This principle would weigh strongly against 
 
 208. Similar considerations and concerns about the effects of patents on sharing have 
arisen in academic science. Academic science is characterized by norms that support open 
dissemination and use of research results. The more scientists can rely on these norms, the 
more willing they will be to continue to share their own discoveries and to use and 
experiment with the discoveries of other scientists, encouraging trust and reciprocity. These 
norms are public knowledge, there are social benefits from encouraging reliance on these 
norms, and it appears that many scientists do indeed rely on these norms. See, e.g., Mark A. 
Lemley, Ignoring Patents, 2008 MICH. ST. L. REV. 19. But see Merges, supra note 68.  
 209. There is an extensive literature on patent holdup, and this principle adopts and 
extends the recommendations that many patent scholars have made in the context of 
patents covering one component of a larger product. See, e.g., Lemley, supra note 195. But 
see F. Scott Kieff & Anne Layne-Farrar, Incentive Effects from Different Approaches to 
Holdup Mitigation Surrounding Patent Remedies and Standard-Setting Organizations, 9 J. 
COMPETITION L. & ECON. 1091 (2013) (emphasizing importance of context but in this case 
to limit the situations of patent holdup that deserve a patent remedy response). 
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awarding injunctive relief where the value of a patented invention is 
largely attributable to its widespread adoption and use by the 
group.210 The interests of the group would nevertheless still be bal-
anced against the interests of the patent owner, and the principle 
will have most application for patents covering inventions that are 
made by members of the group or third-party patent owners who col-
laborate with or directly benefit from the activities of the group. This 
principle would also factor into the determination of damages by ex-
cluding the value that the patented invention has as a result of its 
widespread adoption and use by the group.211  
 The principle will also limit patent remedies to account for the 
benefits, if any, received by the patent owner from the group—
primarily but not exclusively patent owners who are members of the 
group or who obtained their rights to the invention from a member of 
the group. First, the group will have limited ability to patent and re-
strict use of inventions discovered by the group, making bargaining 
with third-party patent owners and members of the group who defect 
and patent their own inventions more difficult.212 Determining when 
an invention has emerged, who the inventors are, and whether and 
how patenting should be pursued, as well as handling negotiations 
with a third party regarding use of their patented technology, can be 
extremely difficult in contexts of massively distributed collective in-
tellectual production. In addition, many systems of cooperative inno-
vation rely on a set of beliefs that are not consistent with patenting 
and enforcing patents. This puts the group at a disadvantage when 
 
 210. For a similar line of reasoning in the context of FRAND promises, see Jorge 
Contrerras, supra note 200 (manuscript at 11-12).    
 211. This approach was adopted by Judge Robart in his modification of the Georgia-
Pacific factors in the Microsoft v. Motorola decision. See, e.g., Contreras, supra note 191. 
Thomas Cotter and Norman Siebrasse have suggested an alternative way of thinking 
about the ex ante hypothetical negotiation, focusing on the ex ante contingent value of 
patented technologies that might be adopted as part of a standard and, if adopted, would 
have higher value. This approach provides a way of thinking about a reasonable ex ante 
negotiation that is not based on holdup value, but rather on the incremental contribution 
that the patented technology makes to the standard as compared with the next best 
alternative technology. See, e.g., Norman Siebrasse, Comments on Sidak Part 2: The Ex 
Ante Contingent Value Approach (Siebrasse), COMP. PAT. REMEDIES BLOG (Dec. 6, 2013), 
http://comparativepatentremedies.blogspot.com/2013/12/comments-on-sidak-part-2-ex-an 
te.html; Thomas F. Cotter, Comments on Sidak, Part 3: Should a FRAND Royalty be 
Higher than a Reasonable Royalty? (Cotter), COMP. PAT. REMEDIES BLOG (Dec. 18, 2013), 
http://comparativepatentremedies.blogspot.com/2013/12/comments-on-sidak-part-3-should-
frand.html. Comparing and evaluating alternative approaches and their implications for 
contexts of cooperative innovation is left for further discussion.   
 212. This principle may actually make it even harder for the group to obtain their own 
patents, making defensive patenting and licensing strategies harder. While I think that 
the benefits of the principle will likely outweigh the costs in the contexts I am focusing on, 
this potential cost should not be ignored.    
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they are forced to pay for their use of a third party’s technology but 
cannot charge for the use of their technology.  
 Second, the group will have limited ability to extract payment for 
the use of its non-patentable contributions by either a group member 
or a third party who obtains a patent covering an invention that was 
discovered through the use of the group’s knowledge. As a result of 
these limits, third parties or defectors from the group may be able to 
capture the benefits of group production for free while extracting 
payment for their own incremental contributions. Where a member of 
the group is able to defect from the group, that is, patent and private-
ly benefit from an invention that builds on the efforts of the group, 
this erodes the group members’ trust that other members of the 
group will adhere to its norms of sharing and reciprocity. Where the 
incremental improvement is made and patented by a third party, the 
result is less harmful to group dynamics but still increases the cost of 
innovation for the group and reduces the incentives of the group 
members to freely and openly share their ideas. If the patent can be 
used to block the future efforts of the group or to extract rents from 
the group through licensing, benefit-sharing is even more skewed, 
and the transaction costs for participants in the cooperative project 
increase.  This problem is not unique to systems of cooperative inno-
vation, but it is particularly harmful to them because it disrupts the 
non-market mechanisms upon which they rely.   
 While existing patent law doctrines of derivation, joint inventor-
ship and prior art significantly limit the ability of an individual to 
patent inventions that utilize, borrow from, or build on group discov-
eries, these protections do not adequately address the following prob-
lems that patents create for group investments in intellectual pro-
duction.213 One of the biggest limits of these existing patent law doc-
trines is their failure to remove the ex ante incentive problems that 
are created when individual members of the group see chances to 
limit their sharing of knowledge so as to increase the chances of their 
own individual discovery and patenting for monetary gain. These 
doctrines also do not address and protect many of the valuable con-
tributions made by group members. Member contributions often take 
the form of tools that increase the chances of invention but are not 
themselves either patentable or prior art for the resulting invention. 
In Foldit, for example, participants develop software programs that 
help to increase scores in the game, and these programs, along with 
observations about how to solve problems in game play, are some-
 
 213. See supra Part II (discussion of limits of these doctrines in cooperative 
innovation contexts).  
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times shared among the players.214 Although the software programs 
and strategies may increase the likelihood that a patentable discov-
ery about proteins will be made, they do not themselves describe such 
a discovery and therefore do not constitute prior art for such a dis-
covery. The people contributing the programs are not joint inventors 
of the resulting discovery. Moreover, although providing valuable in-
formation that increases the chances of a patentable discovery, it is 
unlikely that the software programs or strategies for gameplay will 
themselves be patentable discoveries.  
 Even where the doctrines do apply, they may be difficult and cost-
ly for the group to utilize. Where the group wants to challenge third-
party inventorship claims on the grounds of joint inventorship or der-
ivation, it is forced to undertake the costs of pursuing these claims 
and may find it difficult to satisfy the evidentiary requirements un-
der patent law despite the value of its contributions. The massively 
distributed nature of the group and the importance of keeping trans-
action costs low similarly limit the usefulness of these doctrines. In 
addition, where the group wants the value of its contributions re-
flected in negotiations for the use of third-party patents, it may be 
forced to explore patenting, and this can be inconsistent with and po-
tentially undermine group beliefs and values. Additional help from 
the law is needed to fill these gaps and address these limits. In re-
sponse to some of these gaps, I am suggesting that where a patented 
invention benefits from the knowledge provided by the group, the 
benefits received from the group should be considered and sometimes 
limit the remedy that a patent owner receives.    
 This principle, like the first, builds on and finds support in exist-
ing proposals to address patent holdup by limiting the ability of  
patent holders to obtain injunctive relief and by restricting what  
can be included in the calculation of damages.215 It is also consistent 
with recent court decisions in the context of standard-essential  
patents that seek to limit patent damages to the value of the technol-
ogy and exclude the value conferred by the standardization of this 
technology.216 The principle goes further than these existing ap-
 
 214. See Public-Shared Recipes, FOLDIT, https://fold.it/portal/recipes/public (last visited 
Mar. 22, 2014). 
 215. See, e.g., Cotter, supra note 19, at 1174-87 (explaining how patent law should  
play a role in responding to, or enabling private parties to avoid, patent holdup); Lemley  
& Shapiro, supra note 195 (explaining how patent law should be modified to respond  
to problems of patent holdup and royalty-stacking, including limits on injunctive relief  
and damages). 
 216. See Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., No. C10-1823JLR, 2013 WL 2111217, at *98-
101 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 25, 2013). There are also proposals designed to address patent 
holdup in context of standard-setting. Jay P. Kesan & Carol M. Hayes, FRAND’s Forever: 
Standards, Patent Transfers, and Licensing Commitments, 89 IND. L.J. 231 (2014) (suggest-
ing combination of contract and property principles to govern FRAND commitments); 
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proaches, however. It is not limited to technology standards and pa-
tents covering those standards, but instead applies when a group 
adopts an invention as part of its research platform and this adoption 
and use confers value on the invention. Where the value arising from 
widespread adoption and use is large, this should be a factor weigh-
ing against injunctive relief, and this value should be excluded from 
royalty calculations to the extent that the value reflects simply its 
use as a standard. The principle also requires courts to look at 
whether knowledge contributions from the group were instrumental 
in leading to the invention. If the knowledge contribution was sub-
stantial, this should weigh against injunctive relief and should be 
reflected in reduced royalties. In this way courts will play a role in 
enforcing benefit-sharing and promoting fairness, making members 
of the group more willing to participate and freely contribute their 
work to the group.  
 This principle would play the strongest role in situations where 
members of a cooperative innovation project, such as Linux or Foldit, 
defect with an invention, patent it, and either seek to assert it 
against the group or to assign it to a third party who then asserts it 
against the group. In this case the combination of benefits from group 
production and public interest in continued group use of the inven-
tion would weigh against injunctive relief and would substantially 
limit royalties where the invention relates closely to the intellectual 
production of the group. This principle would also extend, although 
with less force, to limit patent damages where a third party who is 
not a member of the group benefits from the intellectual production 
of the group and/or seeks to hold up the production of the group. In 
the Linux example, Novell and its assignees would have found it hard-
er to enforce their patents against the open source community, and 
knowing this, the open source community would have been less wor-
ried, and the patents would have been less valuable. Novell would 
therefore have had less incentive to defect from the community in the 
 
Merges & Kuhn, supra note 195 (arguing for a standards estoppel doctrine to check for 
good-faith behavior by the patentee). As well, there are proposals designed to protect areas 
of innovation that rely on free sharing of information. Strandburg, supra note 150. Alterna-
tive approaches have included improving incentives of private parties to agree through 
limits on injunctive relief, mandatory arbitration, and other mechanisms for improving 
private ordering. See, e.g., Jorge L. Contreras, Fixing FRAND: A Pseudo-Pool Approach to 
Standards-Based Patent Licensing, 79 ANTITRUST L.J. 47 (2013) (adapting patent pool ap-
proach to standard-setting organizations); Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, A Simple Ap-
proach to Setting Reasonable Royalties for Standard-Essential Patents, 28 BERKELEY TECH. 
L.J. 1135 (2013) (discussing a mandatory arbitration mechanism where owner of standard-
essential patent and standard implementer do not agree on FRAND terms); Timothy 
Simcoe, Governing the Anti-Commons: Institutional Design for Standard Setting Organi-
zations (July 1, 2013) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the National Bureau of Eco-
nomic Research) (examining SSO practices and debates using Elinor Ostrom’s self-
governing common pool framework). 
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first place. Microsoft might have found its patent threats and licensing 
strategies less effective, reducing the need for defensive patenting.  
 This principle could limit incentive problems in Foldit as well. 
Foldit members will have less incentive to use patents opportunisti-
cally and will be more willing to continue to volunteer their efforts 
without compensation if they all know that the contribution of ideas 
by the group will factor heavily in determining remedies for any in-
vention made and patented by a group member. This principle will 
also limit the ability of third parties with inventions that build upon 
or are heavily utilized by the group to the benefit of the patent owner 
to obtain injunctive relief and damages from these infringing uses.217  
 The key challenge in employing this principle is to provide the 
courts with tools or specific guidelines for how to identify and value 
these contributions. Indeed, concerns with the ability of the courts to 
measure the contribution of an invention to a larger product or pro-
ject have stalled changes in patent remedies in the past. Courts are 
now confronting and finding ways to navigate analogous measure-
ment problems, however, in the context of determining reasonable 
royalties for standard-essential patents.218 This provides a starting 
point for courts seeking to take into account the value of group 
knowledge contributions and group use when assessing patent dam-
ages.219 In the hypothetical negotiation of a license to a patented in-
vention, the court would consider not just the value of the patented 
technology but also the value of the intellectual contributions of the 
cooperative innovation community. In this hypothetical exchange, the 
contributions from the group would reduce the royalty owed to the 
patent owner. In addition, royalties to the patent owner would ex-
clude any value that the invention has as a result of its widespread 
adoption by the group. This hypothetical licensing negotiation should 
reflect the reduced bargaining power of the patent owner where in-
junctive relief is unlikely, and the increased bargaining power of the 
group where they are providing value through their activities.  
 
 217. This approach could also address the practical limits of prior art and derivation 
doctrines by presuming that the community has some rights over the invention, leaving the 
patent owner with the burden of showing that the invention did not benefit from 
community production and did not derive its value from adoption by the community as a 
standard technology.  
 218. See, e.g., Cotter, supra note 19, at 1180-88; Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, 
Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1991, 1994 (2007); Mark A. Lemley, 
Ten Things To Do About Patent Holdup of Standards (and One Not To), 48 B.C. L. REV. 
149, 153 (2007).    
 219. How royalties should be determined in this context is an area in which the law 
and commentary are in flux. See, e.g., J. Gregory Sidak, The Meaning of FRAND, Part I: 
Royalties, 9 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 931 (2013); Cotter, supra note 211.  
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 3.   Third Principle  
 The third principle is to reinforce reciprocity in free, open systems 
of innovation.220 This principle would treat both formal and informal 
rules governing open access and sharing of ideas and discoveries as 
commitments by participants to share their own contributions with 
other participants in the project. Where discoveries relevant to free 
and open source projects are made by members of the project, free 
and open access and use of the discoveries by the group should be 
presumed unless the members of the group have explicitly agreed 
otherwise. In this way the law reinforces informal rules and norms of 
reciprocity and reduces the payoffs from defecting from group 
norms.221 Provided that people know about this change in the law in 
advance, it makes it easier for members of the group to commit to 
behavior in compliance with these rules and norms, in addition to 
facilitating ex ante bargaining. The principle would also apply to lim-
it relief for industry members who know about and maybe even bene-
fit from the use of their invention by the cooperative innovation pro-
ject unless these parties have taken reasonable precautions to put 
the community on notice of their proprietary rights before the inven-
tion is in use.  Where third parties develop inventions that rely on 
the work done by an open source project and relate to the open source 
project, this principle would weigh heavily against allowing this third 
party to block the use of the discovery by the group, either through 
an injunction or royalties that are not feasible for group participants 
to pay. The impact of this principle should become larger the closer 
the relationship of the patent owner to the group and the greater the 
benefit to the patent owner of the group’s activities.   
 Open access and reciprocity play critical roles in both open source 
software and crowd science projects.222 In cooperative systems such as 
these, discoveries that benefit from the productive efforts of the 
group should be available for use by the group at either no cost or, 
where the discovery is made outside of the project, at a cost that is 
reasonable in light of the competing interests and investments of the 
group and the patent owner. Efforts have been made to build reci-
procity into open source communities through the use of licenses such 
 
 220. For thoughts on motivating reciprocity, see, for example, Stephen Leider  
et al., Directed Altruism and Enforced Reciprocity in Social Networks, 124 Q.J. ECON.  
1815 (2009).  
 221. For a related idea on how open source systems can reduce opportunism in the 
context of open standards, see, for example, Vetter, supra note 96. 
 222. See, e.g., Jane Kaye et al, Data Sharing in Genomics—Re-Shaping Scientific 
Practices, 10 NATURE REVS. GENETICS 331 (2009); Jennifer C. Molloy, The Open Knowledge 
Foundation: Open Data Means Better Science, 9 PUB. LIBR. SCI. BIOLOGY 1.  
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as the General Public License and the Reciprocal Public License.223 
These contracting approaches are generally limited to the world of 
free and open source software, however, and questions about the en-
forceability and transaction costs associated with these licenses re-
main.224 Large public funding agencies such as the National Institute 
of Health have sought to build reciprocity into public funding re-
quirements, but again with high transaction costs and questionable 
enforceability.225 The principle that I propose can complement these 
efforts. It can also expand upon them, applying in situations where 
there is no contractual privity and without depending upon the or-
ganizational structure that underpins open source software produc-
tion or publicly funded research.   
 In the Foldit context, this principle would limit the ability of both 
members of Foldit and third parties to impede the free use of scien-
tific discoveries by Foldit members for the non-commercial purposes 
of solving Foldit puzzles. It would thus operate in ways that are 
analogous both to proposed concepts of patent fair use and proposals 
for research use exemptions, but in both cases limited to the context 
of crowd science.226 This principle would be most valuable in sustain-
ing non-mainstream, volunteer-based open source projects, which are 
among the most vulnerable to transaction costs and the least able to 
engage in defensive patenting activities.  
 All three of these principles draw from a rich body of research that 
critiques the lack of safe harbors within patent law for publicly bene-
ficial uses of patented technology, particularly where the patented 
technologies have been created through the use of public funds.227 
The patent literature includes a number of carefully constructed pro-
posals for research use exemptions and patent fair use.228 Instead of 
 
 223. See, e.g., Reciprocal Public License 1.5 (RPL-1.5), OPEN SOURCE INITIATIVE (July 
15, 2007), http://opensource.org/licenses/rpl-1.5; see also Tom Hall, Open Source—
Reciprocal Licenses, TECH L. GUY BLOG (Sept. 18, 2013, 12:21 PM), http://techlawguy.blog 
spot.com/2013/09/p-margin-bottom-0.html (including a list of reciprocal open source 
licenses as determined by GNU). 
 224. See, e.g., Gomulkiewicz, supra note 107 (examining the most recent version of 
general public license that tries to deal with issues such as patents and digital rights 
management); Sapna Kumar, Enforcing the GNU GPL, 2006 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 1.  
 225. See, e.g., Arti K. Rai & Bhaven N. Sampat, Accountability in Patenting of 
Federally Funded Research, 30 NATURE BIOTECH. 953 (2012).  
 226. See, e.g., Joshua I. Miller, Towards a Doctrine of Fair Use in Some of Patent Law, 
2 INTELL. PROP. BRIEF 56 (2011); O’Rourke, supra note 151; Strandburg, supra note 150.   
 227. See, e.g., Strandburg, supra note 150 (arguing for the use of defenses and 
exemptions from infringement as a way of responding to the fact that different uses of 
patented technology can have different social costs and benefits).  
 228. See id.; see also Rochelle Dreyfuss, Protecting the Public Domain of Science: Has 
the Time for an Experimental Use Defense Arrived?, 46 ARIZ. L. REV. 457, 464 (2004); 
Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents and the Progress of Science: Exclusive Rights and 
Experimental Use, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1017 (1989) (proposing research-use defense that 
2014]  COOPERATIVE INNOVATION 1123 
 
 
focusing on the types of uses, however, the focus here is on preserv-
ing non-market mechanisms for cooperative innovation. Moreover, 
the principles are not intended as rules that dictate particular patent 
remedies, but rather as mechanisms for expanding the range of in-
terests that courts are required to think about when fashioning pa-
tent remedies.229 These principles require courts to systematically 
take into account the broader costs of patents on socially beneficial 
cooperative innovation when fashioning patent remedies.230 Ideally, 
the principles would also be adopted by agencies such as the Federal 
Trade Commission, the Department of Justice and the International 
Trade Commission, and used to guide future changes in the patent 
statute made by legislators.231 The principles provide a focal point for 
all of these patent policymakers to use when fashioning their re-
sponses to patent problems in contexts of cooperative innovation.  
V.   CONCLUSION 
“Many ideas grow better when transplanted into another mind than 
the one where they sprang up.”—Oliver Wendell Holmes 
 Cooperative innovation can bring together diverse perspectives 
and ideas and harness underutilized human resources in new ways 
to solve previously intractable scientific problems. In some cases, sys-
tems of cooperative innovation that rely at least partially on non-
market mechanisms may complement existing modes of market-
driven innovation. In other cases, they may challenge incumbent sys-
tems of intellectual production and intensify competition in ways 
that accelerate scientific and technological progress. The potential of 
 
distinguishes between situations requiring payment and those not requiring payment, with 
a focus on protecting robust domain for basic research uses); O’Rourke, supra note 151, at 
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patent remedies. See, e.g., Thomas F. Cotter, Patent Remedies and Practical Reason, 88 
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 231. The patent statute provides little guidance for courts in how they determine 
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REV. 1575 (2003).  
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these emerging systems of innovation may be limited, however, by 
patent roadblocks.   
 This Article has shown that patents may sometimes interfere with 
important non-market mechanisms that sustain systems of coopera-
tive innovation by increasing both the costs of participating and the 
benefits of defecting from these systems. While some forms of open, 
collaborative innovation persist in the face of patent threats, they do 
so only at great cost and with uncertainty about their future sustain-
ability. To these costs and uncertainties we must add the social loss 
from potentially valuable innovation paths foreclosed.   
 In response to these concerns, I suggest that courts and other pa-
tent policymakers need to pay more attention to the ways in which 
patent law may systematically disadvantage cooperative innovation. 
As a starting point, I take advantage of current areas of opportunity 
in judicial thinking about patent remedies to propose modest changes 
in the ways that courts implement patent remedies where non-
market mechanisms of cooperation are important. Three principles 
are provided to guide courts in their determinations of patent reme-
dies with cooperative contexts in mind. The principles are intended to 
support cooperation where patents are not already accomplishing 
this goal, and only to the extent that patents are impeding this goal. 
Limiting the negative incentive effects of patents on non-market 
mechanisms in this way may give cooperative innovation systems 
chances to complement and to compete against market-driven sys-
tems of innovation. In addition, a greater legal commitment to bal-
ancing individual interests with broader public interests in coopera-
tive innovation may improve the relationships that cooperative inno-
vative communities have to patent law. Implementing patent law in 
ways that take the interests and needs of these communities into ac-
count may move us closer towards a patent system that can accom-
modate alternative paradigms of innovation. 
